Il ‘mito’ dell’originario (definitivamente perduto?). Un frammento giovanile di Hölderlin e uno di Hegel a confronto

Resumo

 No definitive position is traceable in the present work, but only some descriptions and reflections about the philosophical question of what is original or beginning through analyses on Hölderlin’s Seyn und Urtheil (variously entitled) and Hegel’s Reines Selbstbewußseyn / Reines Leben. Despite their dissonances of sensitivity and aesthetic and philosophical interests, which can be generally summarized with the principle of an initial albeit aporetic conception of consciousness (Hölderlin) and with the insight of a vitalistic or secondary (phenomenological) conception of it (Hegel), the problem of the beginning has completely ‘faded’ or ‘weakened’ with and after their contributions. This problem seems to become belonging to something unjustifiably narrative, anthropological or merely indefinable, to a ‘mythical’ schematism or a simple ‘mythosis’ (psychological invention), even if this point of view cannot diminish at all the exceptional height and depth of thinking about it, offered by Hölderlin and Hegel, this essay tries to echo in its essential instances.