A Crítica de Schelling à concepção da Lógica hegeliana como metafísica da fundação da realidade
The present article discusses Schelling’s criticism of the hegelian conception of the Logic in his philosophy of revelation. This criticism is formulated within the framework of the distinction between “negative” and “positive” philosophy, which is fundamental to the late Schelling’s thinking. At its heart is the rejection of the contrast between logical idea and reality (nature), and of the conception of the Logic as a categorial ontology. It is argued that Schelling’s criticism is fair, in so far as Schelling rejects the hegelian conception of a passage from the idea to nature in the sense of an exteriorization of the idea, but that his rejection of the conception of a categorial ontology, which denies the objectivity of thinking, fails.
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