

HEGEL'S LOGICAL INSTRUCTION AT THE GYMNASIUM ILLUSTRE (1776-1778): THE TEXTBOOKS IN CONTEXT

A INSTRUÇÃO LÓGICA DE HEGEL NO *GYMNASIUM ILLUSTRE* (1776-1778): OS TEXTOS EM
CONTEXTO

Daniel Badenhorst*

RESUMO: Este artigo é uma contribuição à pequena literatura que lida com a instrução lógica formal de G.W.F. Hegel. Especificamente, busca-se clarificar a natureza, a base e o contexto educacional das instruções lógicas que Hegel recebeu durante sua passagem no *Gymnasium Illustre* em Stuttgart (1776-1778). Começa com uma breve seção biográfica na qual o papel de um único outro acadêmico que tem contribuído significativamente para uma discussão acerca das instruções lógicas iniciais de Hegel, Riccardo Pozzo, é corrigida e atualizada. Assim, segue-se a descrição da natureza dos textos lógicos que Hegel encontrou devido à sua formação inicial. Além disso, para descrever brevemente o conteúdo e a noção da lógica que opera nesses textos, este artigo também, resumidamente, explora o contexto no qual Hegel encontrou *esses textos particulares* e não outros. Ao providenciar ao leitor uma interessante e rica documentação dessas instruções lógicas que Hegel recebeu no *Gymnasium* de Stuttgart, o interessado pode agora explorar qualquer um desses aspectos em maior detalhe, na medida em que sejam relevantes, necessários ou ambos. Devido a essa limitação de escopo e a natureza ainda imatura deste debate acadêmico, o presente artigo constitui uma contribuição que deve ser considerada documental e biográfica.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Hegel, Biografia Filosófica, Lógica, Neo-humanismo, Wolff

ABSTRACT: This article is a contribution to the all too small literature which deals with G.W.F. Hegel's formal logical instruction. Specifically, it looks to clarify the nature, basis and educational context of the logical instruction that Hegel received during his time at the *Gymnasium Illustre* in Stuttgart (1776–1788). It begins with a brief biographical section where the account of the only other scholar to have significantly contributed to a discussion of the early Hegel's logical instruction, Riccardo Pozzo, is corrected and updated. It then proceeds to describe the nature of the logic textbooks that Hegel encountered thanks to his early education. In addition to briefly describing the content and notion of logic operative in these textbooks the article also summarily explores the context in which Hegel encountered *these particular textbooks* and not others. In providing the reader with an interesting and rich documentation of the logical instruction Hegel received at the Stuttgart *Gymnasium*, the interested party may now explore any of these aspects in greater deal as they consider it relevant, necessary or both. Because of this limitation of scope and the still immature nature of this scholarly debate this paper makes a contribution that ought to be considered documentarian and biographical.

KEYWORDS: Hegel, Philosophical Biography, Logic, Neohumanism, Wolff

*Atualmente concluindo mestrado em Filosofia na Macquarie University (Austrália), abordando de forma pioneira a primeira leitura histórico-crítica em língua inglesa dos escritos pré-frankfurtianos de Hegel desde os estudos desenvolvidos por H.S Harris sobre o “Desenvolvimento de Hegel” (à luz de novas pesquisas da *Meiner Gesammelte Werke*). E-mail: daniel.badenhorst@students.mq.edu.au. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2144-7384>



1.

Despite the wealth of material written on G.W.F. Hegel's *Science of Logic*, very little is known about Hegel's earliest encounter with the discipline of logic itself. With the exception of Riccardo Pozzo, most scholars have been, as H.S. Harris has noted,¹ content to refer to Hegel's report that, he 'was familiar with the Wolffian logic from the age of fourteen and knew the definition of the *idea clara* when he was twelve'.² Some go even further and, like Terry Pinkard, paraphrase the less often cited part of the report noting that Hegel knew 'all the classical rules of the syllogism taught to him in school'.³

Thanks to Hegel's statement, it could generally be said that Hegel's logic of the Stuttgart period was the logic of Christian Wolff. But this utterance would be as contentless as saying that the young Hegel was an 'adherent of Kant's practical philosophy'.⁴ For, as careful historians of this period of German philosophy have noted, what it meant to be a Kantian was not at all clear.⁵ In fact, all manner of philosophers with all manner of philosophical positions claimed their status as rightful heirs to the Kantian inheritance.⁶

Of course, Wolff's status and legacy was not nearly as contested as Kant's. But it was nevertheless difficult to group any given number of Wolffians together. As Wilhelm Risse noted, 'Despite the authoritative orientation of the Wolffian school towards the person and the textbooks of Wolff, it exhibits, with regard to logic, a series of quite different doctrines'.⁷ If one wants to understand the status of logic for the Stuttgart Hegel it is important to be specific about his reception both of Wolff and of logic more generally. This means outlining the nature and content of his philosophical, and hence logical, education at the Gymnasium.

¹ HARRIS, H.S. Review: Hegel: 'Introductio in philosophiam'. *Dagli studi ginnasiali alia prima logica (1782–1801)*. By Riccardo Pozzo. Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1989, pp. xxviii + 269, **Hegel-Bulletin**, vol. 10, n. 2, 1989, pp. 48–50, 48. POZZO, R. **Hegel: 'Introductio in philosophiam'. *Dagli studi ginnasiali alla prima logica (1782–1801)***. Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1989. This article is indebted to Pozzo's ground-breaking research on Hegel's early logical studies.

² ROSENKRANZ, K. **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Leben**. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1844, pp. 25–26.

³ PINKARD, T. **Hegel: A Biography**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 10.

⁴ This formula comes from DÜSING, K. *Jugendschriften*. In: Pöggeler, O. (Ed). **Hegel: Einführung in seine Philosophie**. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1977, pp. 28–42, 30 but it is present throughout the secondary literature on the young Hegel.

⁵ This is documented in detail in DI GIOVANNI, G. **Freedom and Religion in Kant and his Immediate Successors: The Vocation of Humankind (1774–1800)**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

⁶ This is leaving aside the vexed question of what it means to call Hegel a Kantian today, after more than two hundred years of Kant scholarship and the availability of the *Akademie* edition. As di Giovanni rightly notes, these historical details are mostly ignored in Anglophone literature which never ceases to read historical periods in light of contemporary concerns, c.f., **Freedom and Religion**, p.xi.

⁷ RISSE, W. **Die Logik der Neuzeit: 1640-1780**. V. 2. Stuttgart: Frommann, 1970, p. 615.

It also ideally involves attending to Hegel's references to logic in the various writings, diary entries, and excerpts from the period. To focus exclusively on one of these aspects – only his formal education or just his independent reading – would be to obscure the matter. For, as Pozzo has correctly noted, summarising Karl Rosenkranz, Hegel's parents and various mentors guided and encouraged him to embark 'on an ambitious programme of studies and readings that was to serve as a supplement to what he was doing at grammar school'.⁸The two aspects of Hegel's early learning are complimentary.

To deal with both simultaneously is, however, an extremely ambitious project, as Pozzo's book on Hegel's early logic studies demonstrates. Moreover, it necessitates surveying and summarising not only a vast secondary literature but an even vaster quantity of historical writings on the Württemberg school system alongside the frankly astounding quantity of literature that the young grammar school student read, digested, and commented upon. This article therefore adopts a more limited scope and hones in on the logical instruction Hegel was exposed to at the *Gymnasium*, this article will first outline the nature and structure of the *Gymnasium Illustre* with some clarifications about Hegel's biography. These biographical clarifications are crucial insofar as they determine if Hegel was exposed to certain classes and textbooks. With extensive reference to Pozzo's research, some conclusions about the textbooks and hence logical instruction Hegel received during his years in the *Gymnasium* are drawn. This then allows in the second and third sections of this article to take up each of these textbooks in turn and both describe their 'approach' to logic and situate them in the practical-political context thanks to which Hegel was exposed to *these* exact works and not others. It is hoped that this intellectual-historical work might provide some important starting points for scholars to begin investigating more precisely Hegel's development, and concept of logic in particular.

1.1 Logic in the Gymnasium: Structure of the School and the Logic Textbooks

Hegel was enrolled at the *Gymnasium Illustre* in Stuttgart in 1776, at six years of age.⁹ The school had been established in 1685 by Friedrich Karl the Duke of Württemberg but was

⁸ 'Introductio', p. 23.

⁹ SPIEGEL, H. *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie - Frühe Denkmotive: Die Stuttgarter Jahre 1770-1788*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001, p. 19. As Spiegel has shown, there is some confusion about this date in the literature. Harris claims Hegel began in 1777, but he has here, as in much else, simply benefitted from Carmelo Lacorte's research which itself is based on either a transcription of translation error from

only officially opened in 1686. Its curriculum was from the outset defined by the political and ideological tensions that existed in Württemberg at the time and the school would find itself constantly at the centre of the contest between Church and State, i.e., between the *Konsistorium* (the supreme regulatory body for the Protestant Church in Württemberg) and the pedagogically minded local political authorities (the Dukes Karl Eugen and Ludwig Eugen successively).¹⁰ Consequently, any simple characterisation of the school – as either outdated or conservative – would miss its mark.

Unlike the Latin and Monastic schools which committed students from the outset to theological studies, the *Gymnasium Illustre*'s purpose was to prepare its students for further study, usually in jurisprudence or medicine.¹¹ As Pinkard notes, however, fifty percent of graduates pursued theology after graduating.¹² This was because the *Konsistorium* had wanted the *Gymnasium* to function like the other schools in the area and it seems that they had, for a long time, ensured that it did.¹³ Despite this, during the period of Hegel's attendance from 1776 until 1781 the school was increasingly feeling the effects of the Duke's enlightening efforts.

The great reform of the curriculum, which would formalise the new approach to the classical languages and introduce a great number of secular subjects, would only occur in 1794, i.e., well after Hegel had left as he graduated from the *Gymnasium* in 1788. But, as Lacorte has already argued, this reform would only 'officially consecrate' many of the changes that had already been introduced for some time.¹⁴ It thus must be held, against Pozzo, that despite the use of some rather traditional teaching methods, Hegel did in fact attend the school during a time of ferment and reform. While the formal structure of the school - the divisions of the subjects and classes - had remained unchanged for almost 100 years, a good deal that was highly unorthodox, but not necessarily subversive, could be found taught within the confines of this ancient architecture.¹⁵ This included, among other things, the use of non-

Rosenkranz' German to Italian. Pinkard, like Spiegel, claims the likely date of Hegel's entry was 1776 and I concur with them, due primarily to the powerful arguments made by Spiegel.

¹⁰ Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 21.

¹¹ FRANZ, M. Das Höhere Bildungswesen des Herzogtums Württemberg im 18. Jahrhundert. In: Franz, M. & Jacobs, W.G. (Eds). „...so hat mir/ Das Kloster etwas genüzet“: *Hölderlin und Schellings Schulbildung in der Nürtinger Lateinschule und den württembergischen Klosterschulen*. Hölderlin Gesellschaft: Eggingen, 2004, p. 18.

¹² Pinkard, *Hegel*, p. 8.

¹³ Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 24.

¹⁴ Lacorte, *Il primo Hegel*, p. 64.

¹⁵ Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, 27.

traditional teaching manuals and numerous professors who were not only unusually worldly for Württemberg but also unusually troublesome for the orthodox Protestant church.¹⁶

It is worth briefly outlining the general course of studies so that one has a sense of where logic fitted into this complicated educational context. The classes of the *Untergymnasium* (Lower Gymnasium) dealt almost entirely with, on the one hand, the acquisition and use of Latin and Ancient Greek, with the intention of reading authors of the classic age of both Rome and Greece, alongside the study of the German language and, on the other, with the basics of arithmetic, geometry and history.

In the *Obergymnasium* [Upper Gymnasium] the subjects were presented in six groups: i) *disciplines philologicae* included the study of Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French and Italian; ii) *disciplines Ingeniosae* included poetry and eloquence; iii) *disciplines historicae* included sacred history as well as both special and universal history, geography, Roman antiquity, natural history; iv) *disciplines mathematicae* included arithmetic, geometry and physics; v) *disciplines philosophiae* included logic, metaphysics and moral philosophy; and finally vi) *disciplines theologicae* involved the study of the various aspects of theology.¹⁷

According to this picture Hegel would have first encountered logic during his time in the *Untergymnasium*. This is the conclusion that, for instance, Pozzo arrives at in his magnificent study on logic in the young Hegel.¹⁸ However, since the period of Hegel's attendance is a period of change, one should not assume that the normal course of study continued to apply. According to Spiegel's authoritative reconstruction,¹⁹ Hegel's time at the Gymnasium looks as follows:

Lower Gymnasium		
<i>Class</i>	<i>School year</i>	<i>Teacher</i>
I. (infima)	1776–1777	(Lenz/Knorr?)

¹⁶ On the religious-political context of the choice of compendia see FRANZ, M. Die Logikkompendien im Herzogtum Württemberg 1559-1793 - Ein bibliographischer Überblick. In: Franz, M. & Jacobs, W.G. (Eds). „...so hat mir/ Das Kloster etwas genüzet“: Hölderlin und Schellings Schulbildung in der Nürtinger Lateinschule und den württembergischen Klosterschulen. Hölderlin Gesellschaft: Eggingen, 2004. On the troublesome rationalism of the 'old guard' see Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 28-9.

¹⁷ This presentation is drawn from MONTONERI, Luciano. 'Note di diario'. In G.W.F. Hegel *Note di Diario (Tagebuch I-II)*. Trans. & Ed. Montoneri, L. Marin A. Catania 1979, xiii-xiv. It is important to note this wide range of formal learning as scholars of the young Hegel tend to focus only on those aspects that retrospectively seem important. In Klaus Vieweg's recent biography, for instance, there is absolutely no mention of the early logical studies and all the attention is given to Kant, Schiller and the Enlightenment literature.

¹⁸ Pozzo, 'Introductio', p. 7.

¹⁹ Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 18.

I. (media)	1777–1778	(Lenz)
I. (suprema)	1778–1779	Löffler
II.	1779–1780	Löffler
III.	1780–1781	Göriz
IV.	1781–1782	Faber
V. 1 st Year	1782–1783	Nast
V. 2 nd Year	1783–1784	Nast
Upper Gymnasium		
VI. 1 st Year	1784–1785	
VI. 2 nd Year	1785–1786	
VII. 1 st Year	1786–1787	
VII. 2 nd Year	1787–1788	

Whereas Pozzo had claimed that Hegel encountered logic in class IV with Jonathan Heinrich Faber in 1782/83, thanks to a more careful handling of evidence Spiegel has now shown that Hegel took class IV one year earlier in 1781/82.²⁰ Now this in and of itself does not contradict the assertion that Hegel encountered logic in the *Untergymnasium* with Faber. However, a problem arises when it is recognised that ‘As of October 1781, logic was taught only from VI grade onward only in the four years of the *Obergymnasium*’.²¹ That is to say, logic was no longer taught in class IV. In so far as it can be ascertained that Hegel only began class IV in toward the end of 1781 (around October), it is likely he did not receive logical instruction with Faber

Hegel did, however, need to know dialectics (another name of logic at the time) for the *Landexam* which he needed to pass if he wanted to pursue free studies at the *Tübingen Stift*.²² Hegel notes that he had to memorise logical definitions²³ for this exam and as a result it must be assumed that Hegel learnt logic during these earlier years, even if not in the class with Faber as has been traditionally assumed thanks to Pozzo’s research. Indeed, Hegel first took

²⁰ Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 19.

²¹ Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 47.

²² STAHLCKER, R., *Geschichte des humanistischen Schulwesens in Württemberg: Allgemeine Geschichte des Lateinschulwesens und Geschichte der Lateinschulen ob der Steig*. V. 3.1 Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1927, pp. 146-167.

²³ Something also commented on in KLAIBER, J. *Holderlin, Hegel und Schelling in ihren schwabischen Jugendjahren*. Tübingen: J.G. Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, 1877 p. 119.

the *Landexam* in 1780.²⁴ This date is one year before he would be introduced to logic at school according to Spiegel's dating and two years before according to Pozzo's. It must therefore be definitively concluded that, regardless of whether Hegel took Faber's logic class in the *Untergymnasium*, Hegel had without a shred of doubt been studying logic independently in preparation for these competitive exams.²⁵

Fortunately, when it comes to Hegel's time in the *Obergymnasium* we have stronger evidence. During his time in the *Obergymnasium*, Hegel would study logic with Heinrich David Cleß who taught it in both Class VI (1784–86) and Class VII (1786–88).²⁶ Hegel seems to have been close with Cleß and we have evidence suggesting the two went for walks together.²⁷ But one should not conclude from this that Hegel had any great attraction to philosophy above all else.²⁸ After all, Cleß only lectured on philosophy for one hour a week and his primary duty was to teach Latin, including reading and translating Livy which was of particular interest to the young Hegel.²⁹ Even on his walks with Cleß, Hegel records that the two mostly discussed physics, solid geometry and the solar system.³⁰

Unfortunately, the level of training and the philosophical positions of Cleß are unknown other than in the broadest of strokes. We cannot, in short, discern the nature of the logic to which Hegel was introduced in the *Obergymnasium* on the basis of references to self-published logical or philosophical treatise.

This leaves the investigation into the logic Hegel studied during his time in Stuttgart in a double difficulty. On the one hand, Hegel did not study logic formally at the Gymnasium during his first years there. However, he did need to teach himself the definitions of logic for the *Landexam* in 1780 and therefore some acquaintance with logic from at least 1780 as it was traditionally taught must be assumed. On the other hand, Cleß's own approach to logic is unclear.

However, both difficulties can be circumvented by asking after the textbooks or compendia Hegel likely encountered during these years. Unlike the period during which

²⁴ SCHÄFER, V. Hegel im Landexamen. *Hegel-Studien*, vol. 24, 1989, p. 16.

²⁵ As Franz sums up the contents of the *Landexamen*, 'The written and oral examinations were mainly in Latin, of course, but also in Greek and Hebrew, and finally also in rhetoric and logic', *Das Höhere Bildungswesen des Herzogtums Württemberg im 18. Jahrhundert*, p. 20.

²⁶ Cleß also instructed Hegel in metaphysics but morals were taught by Kielmann.

²⁷ See the *Tagebuch* entries on the 4, 15, 21, 22–25 July 1785 in *GW*, 6–11.

²⁸ Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 13-14.

²⁹ HARRIS, H.S. *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight 1770–1801*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1792, p. 9n3.

³⁰ This confirms the recollection of Hegel's sister, Christiane Hegel, that Hegel was enthused and preoccupied with physics while at the gymnasium, c.f., Harris, *Hegel's Development*, vol. I, p. 9n3.

Hegel himself would become a teacher,³¹ education during late the 18th century in Württemberg still took place according to officially approved and adopted textbooks.³² This fact has meant that it has become generally accepted by historians of philosophy working on this period that 'curricula and examination regulations, textbooks and school handbooks must indeed be regarded as the relevant sources for reconstructing the general intellectual background of a "great" individual in the history of philosophy or literature', at least as far as famous figures of classical German philosophy are concerned.³³ In fact, in Württemberg *only* state approved materials could be used for teaching purposes which was not the case for other territories in the Holy Roman Empire. Thus, the need to consider the role of compendia when analysing the formative cultural and intellectual atmosphere for thinkers from this region - such as Hegel, Hölderlin, Schelling or Schiller - is even greater than for those in other duchies or regions.

School textbooks are, however, remarkably 'ephemeral' intellectual products.³⁴ They come in and out of fashion and are often regionally specific. Thankfully it is possible to state with real certainty which logic textbooks were used during Hegel's time in the Gymnasium. This gives us a window both into the logic he was taught during his time in the *Obergymnasium* and into the logic he likely studied in preparation for his 1780 *Landexam*.

Highly probable claims can be made about the latter as the professors of the *Gymnasium Illustre* exerted 'the greatest influence' on both the content and the manner of the *Landexamen* such that the exams were always based upon or intimately related to the content taught in the grammar school.³⁵ As Michael Franz summarises, 'What had been introduced as a textbook in the Stuttgart grammar school thus also became the basis of the examination system for the regional examinations'.³⁶ From this it can be tentatively concluded that Hegel would have begun his logic studies according to the compendium that was used for the introductory logic classes in the *Untergymnasium*, even if he did not take those classes himself. Therefore, despite Spiegel's having demonstrated the inconsistency of the reasons for

³¹ On the way this change caused Hegel to become first and foremost a lecturer and the consequences this had for the form of transmission of Hegel's philosophy see JAESCHKE, W. De nuptiis philologiae et philosophiae. *Hegel-Studien*, vol. 11, n. 1, 2018, p. 22.

³² Hence revolutions and shifts in culture could be traced to which textbooks came to predominate, Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 26n42.

³³ Franz, *Das Höhere Bildungswesen des Herzogtums Württemberg im 18. Jahrhundert*, p. 11.

³⁴ Franz, *Das Höhere Bildungswesen des Herzogtums Württemberg im 18. Jahrhundert*, p. 11.

³⁵ Franz, *Das Höhere Bildungswesen des Herzogtums Württemberg im 18. Jahrhundert*, p. 20.

³⁶ Franz, *Das Höhere Bildungswesen des Herzogtums Württemberg im 18. Jahrhundert*, p. 20.

Pozzo's conclusions about which logic textbooks Hegel encountered during his time in the *Gymnasium*, Pozzo's conclusions themselves ought to be retained.³⁷

So, what were Pozzo's conclusion? The textbook, issued in October 1751, that formed the basis of Hegel's first encounter with logic was the *Elementa Philosophiæ Rationalis, sive Compendium Logicæ: In Usum Publicum Scholarum Wirtembergicarum Adornatum* (*Compendium* for short) which was published anonymously. Its author, Pozzo concluded, was J.C. Knaus.³⁸ Because Pozzo was the first scholar to pay serious attention to this text his conclusion has become the accepted one and is still being reproduced today.³⁹ Knaus was not, however, the author of the compendium. The original author was Paul Eugen Layriz and Knaus only played the role of translator and editor, rendering Layriz' text into proper Latin and giving it the appropriate form for a Württemberg school compendium.⁴⁰ Nevertheless Pozzo was correct in identifying the text which formed the basis of logic instruction in the *Untergymnasium*. Therefore, since Layriz' *Compendium* had been used by Faber in the *Untergymnasium* to introduce the students to the basic elements of logic, and because the *Gymnasium's* teaching materials informed the *Landexamen*, Layriz' *Compendium* must also be the book from which Hegel began memorising definitions for his first examination in 1780.

The other logic textbook that Hegel definitely encountered during his formal studies of logic with Cleß in the *Obergymnasium* was Johann August Ernesti's *Initia philosophiæ solidioris*. In fact, according to Spiegel, 'It should also be noted that this textbook was not only used for the subjects of rhetoric and logic, but also metaphysics and moral philosophy, and thus held a quasi-monopoly position in the philosophical field in the broad sense'.⁴¹ This close connection between logic and grammar - the learning of classical languages and rhetoric - was fundamental to the old structure of the *Gymnasium*, based as it was on the old humanistic model. In fact, Ernesti's textbook continued to be retained by Hegel for most of his life.⁴²

³⁷ Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 48.

³⁸ Walter Jaeschke agrees with Pozzo's conclusions here, JAESCHKE, W. *Hegel Handbuch: Leben – Werke – Schule*. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler Verlag, 2016, p. 2.

³⁹ See SALA, L. & KABESHKIN, A. (2022) A priori philosophy of nature in Hegel and German rationalism. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, vol. 30, n. 5, 797-817.

⁴⁰ Franz, Die Logikkompendien im Herzogtum Württemberg 1559-1793 - Ein bibliographischer Überblick, pp. 221-222.

⁴¹ Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 49.

⁴² *Encyclopedia logic*, p. 61, *Science of Logic*, p. 36.

1.2 Logic in the Gymnasium: *The Compendium Logicae*

With this result in hand, it is possible to ascertain the basic nature of the logic that Hegel was exposed to via the Gymnasium. The *Compendium* was, as Harris notes, a very simplified version of Wolff's *Latin Logic* (1728).⁴³ This suggests that Hegel may not have been exaggerating when he claimed he had a firm grasp both of Wolff's definitions and of the various forms of syllogisms.

The *Compendium* was, as Knaus' preface declares, compiled as a result of two factors. On the one hand, it was thanks to the continued public utility of scholastic texts which at the time were still used as the basis of the educational program adopted by schools. On the other hand, the textbooks to which one could turn for this purpose were not suited to the nature and tastes of modern philosophy. That is, a textbook was needed within which one could find both carefully arranged definitions and divisions to be committed to memory and 'modern logic', which for the author meant the logic of Wolff.⁴⁴

Insofar as it fulfilled both these tasks, summarising the approach to logic found within the *Compendium* is simple. However, because logic was a *part* of philosophy and plays a sharply delineated function within it, I will briefly sketch the broader picture of what philosophy is according to this compendium in order to make the discussion of logic that follows clearer.

Philosophy is, according to the *Compendium*, knowledge of reasons of things.⁴⁵ Importantly this means knowing how to answer questions both about why and about how things happen. Knowledge of both this why and how is what makes knowledge properly philosophical, and also what distinguishes philosophical knowledge from historical or vulgar knowledge.⁴⁶ To take an example used by the *Compendium*, Newton was a philosopher and

⁴³ Harris, 'Review Pozzo', p. 48; Pozzo, 'Introductio', p. 10.

⁴⁴ *Compendium*, pp. i-ii; Franz, Die Logikkompendien im Herzogtum Württemberg 1559-1793, 221; SCHENK, G. Das Württembergische Logikkompedium von 1751. „...so hat mir/ Das Kloster etwas genüzet“: Hölderlin und Schellings Schulbildung in der Nürtinger Lateinschule und den württembergischen Klosterschulen. Hölderlin Gesellschaft: Eggingen, 2004, p. 188.

⁴⁵ *Compendium*, §12, p. 8.

⁴⁶ *Compendium*, §1, p. 1. I have avoided discussing the third type of knowledge which is important to the Wolffian paradigm because it plays less of a role in the compendium. For a brief discussion of Wolff's tripartite distinction of cognition - into historical, philosophical and mathematical - see the excellent article SALES VILALTA, G. Entre Schulphilosophie y ciencia moderna - la filosofía de Christian Wolff. *Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía*, vol. 39, n. 1, 2022, p. 75. Sales Vilalta notes however, that Wolff was not always systematic in distinguishing the types of knowledge and the opposition between philosophical and non-philosophical (common) knowledge [abrupt here] often acts as a substitute for the tripartite distinction, p. 75n11.

had philosophical knowledge because he could explain both the why and the how of the things he observed. However, a student is not a philosopher if they simply repeat Newton's formulation without understanding it. In this case the student would know *that* the formulation is true, but not how or why it is true. The student would therefore only obtain vulgar or historical knowledge, knowledge of the *that*.⁴⁷

This is not to suggest that philosophical knowledge is utterly divorced from historical knowledge. Rather, it is simply more complex and can verify both *that* something is and how and why this thing that is, is. It includes historical knowledge within itself but is not limited to it. This is significant for the general orientation of the *Compendium*. It does not seek to propose an *a priori* science of all things from reason alone. Instead, philosophy, according to this picture, must begin from historical knowledge or,⁴⁸ which is the same thing said differently, philosophy must begin from sensation for sensation alone is the source of our historical knowledge.⁴⁹ Philosophy is simply one form of human cognition among many,⁵⁰ and, as experience teaches us – so the *Compendium* argues – all human cognition begins from sensation.⁵¹

More precisely, it is not simply knowledge of the how and why of the thing. It is rather the science of the reasons and causes of things which demonstrates from indubitable principles, as much as the human intellect is able, why things are so and not otherwise.⁵² Philosophy is thus distinguished from historical knowledge not just by virtue of the questions it asks and answers but by the way it asks and answers them. It must proceed scientifically from indubitable principles according to inscrutable demonstrative reasoning.⁵³ And,

⁴⁷ *Compendium*, §8, p. 6.

⁴⁸ *Compendium*, §11, p.7. Something that is true for Wolff as well, c.f. Sales Vilalta, *Entre Schulphilosophie y ciencia moderna - la filosofia de Christian Wolff*, p. 76.

⁴⁹ *Compendium*, §9, p. 6. According to the Wolffian paradigm historical knowledge also 'confirms or corroborates [confirmarlo o corroborarlo]' our knowledge, Sales Vilalta, *Entre Schulphilosophie y ciencia moderna - la filosofia de Christian Wolff*, p. 76.

⁵⁰ *Compendium*, §1, p. 1.

⁵¹ *Compendium*, §11, p. 7.

⁵² *Compendium*, §18, p. 13.

⁵³ *Compendium*, §20, p. 14. According to Wolff, 'by science I mean here the habit of proving assertions, that is, [the habit] of inferring [assertions] by legitimate derivations from certain and immutable principles' [*Per scientiam hic intelligo habitum asserta demonstrandi, hoc est, ex principiis certis et immotis per legitimam consequentiam inferendi*], Wolff, C. *Gesammelte Werke. II Abteilung, Band 1.1 (Philosophia rationalis sive logica, pars 1)*, Hildesheim: Olms, 1987, p.14 [Latin Logic, "Discursus", §30].

importantly, its result will be a demonstration as to the necessity of the causes being so and not otherwise, serving a justificatory function akin to theodicy.⁵⁴

Now, because philosophy is knowledge from first principles proceeding according to inscrutable reasoning, it must be asked: what are these principles and what is the correct procedure of reasoning? Logic enters the picture here. According to the *Compendium*, logic is precisely that discipline which provides thought both with its own unambiguous principles as well as its inscrutable method.⁵⁵ Logic, that is, provides thought with definitions, axioms and principles as well as the path that legitimate reasoning must follow.

Logic is thus useful as an introduction to philosophy. Its fundamental role is the clarification and proper presentation of the rules of thought which govern thought in its everyday practice. In the technical vocabulary this meant that there were two types of logic. On the one hand, there is logic as it is practiced by human beings in their normal engagement with the world: natural logic (*logica naturalis*). This type of logic accounts for the fact that learning logic is not a precondition for the ability to reason well.⁵⁶ Because this logic is not learned, it is necessarily considered innate and implanted in our soul by God.⁵⁷

Insofar as there are laws of thought it must then be possible to know them.⁵⁸ This is the case because we err when we do not apply or follow these rules of thinking correctly. But God would not make things so that we would be incapable of following the same rules it prescribed. The reflection upon the rules by which we can properly think and hence direct our activity according to God's prescription is logic proper or *logica artificialis*. This artificial logic does not deal with anything but the rules already at work in *logica naturalis* except this time we are aware of the how and the why of our reasoning.⁵⁹

Here again the difference between vulgar and philosophical knowledge can be seen to operate. In *logica artificialis* we come to know the necessary rules that made us naturally

⁵⁴ Metaphysics shows that all things have their reason in God since God has created all things (both bodies and souls), *Compendium*, §21, p. 15. The entire object of the Wolffian philosophy was possibility and it concerned itself with justifying why the existence of x or y was possible, i.e., had its reasons.

⁵⁵ *Compendium*, §20, p. 14.

⁵⁶ *Compendium*, §49–50, p. 38–39.

⁵⁷ *Compendium*, §50, p. 39. The theological aspect of Wolff's philosophy ought not to be downplayed. As Risse writes, 'Wolff, inspired primarily by Leibniz, shaped for the last time on Protestant soil a thoroughly doctrinal-rational, methodologically thorough and thematically comprehensive school philosophy, which dominated the general discussion of philosophy in Germany for half a century and had an impact beyond the framework of Protestantism, *Die Logik der Neuzeit*, p. 580.

⁵⁸ *Compendium*, §51.

⁵⁹ Or, 'The *logica naturalis* and *artificialis* complement each other in the sense of a reasonable elucidation of the natural given', Schenk, *Das Württembergische Logikkompodium von 1751*, p. 193

identify false or true inferences or deductions, i.e., we come to know how and why something was false or true. The difference between the two logics is one of clarity and distinctness. Moreover, because of this same philosophical paradigm, the further consequence is drawn that, since distinct knowledge is superior to confused knowledge, the *logica artificialis* is the best way to perfect our knowledge and guarantee that we do not befall the natural punishment (error; theoretical or practical) for not following these laws.⁶⁰

Logic, therefore, must be taught before logic is used. The rules of thought must be taught before they are put into practice.⁶¹ This also means, insofar as these rules govern the use of our intellect, that logic is the clarification of the nature of our intellect and the demonstration of how to apply these rules scientifically, that is, according to indubitable principles and through solid reasoning.

As for the general structure of the logical discipline, it is divided into a theoretical part, a practical part and a 'doctrine of the principles of knowledge'. Whereas theoretical logic deals with the operations of the intellect conception, judgement and syllogism, practical logic describes the applications of these operations in the search for or judgement of truth; the correspondence of concepts and judgements with the things themselves.⁶² Finally, the doctrine of principles presents first the indemonstrable principle of non-contradiction and from this derives the principle of sufficient reason.

Insofar as this article deals with the 'practical dimensions' of Hegel's early logic, I will focus on this practical part of the *Compendium*. As stated above, the practical part of logic deals with the application of the operations of the intellect in search of truth. Specifically, it concerns itself with the 'doctrine of the invention, judgement, presentation and defence of truth'.⁶³ In essence, Layritz and his editor Knaus sought to introduce young grammar school students to the theories of truth and proof such that they could create arguments, identify faults in the arguments of others, and defend their own.

Logic, or rational philosophy - the two are synonymous at this time⁶⁴ - in the Wolffian mode teaches the correct use of the intellect in knowing truth and falsehood and it is hence aimed at the discernment of truths (properly derived conclusions from properly stated

⁶⁰ These conclusions are drawn in the **Compendium**, §52–3, pp. 43–44.

⁶¹ **Compendium**, §54, p. 45.

⁶² Schenk, *Das Württembergische Logikkompodium von 1751*, pp. 201–202

⁶³ Schenk, *Das Württembergische Logikkompodium von 1751*, p. 190.

⁶⁴ Risse, **Die Logik der Neuzeit**, p. 509; Schenk, *Das Württembergische Logikkompodium von 1751*, p. 187.

premises) and the correction of falsity (improperly derived results or faulty premises).⁶⁵ This practical function directly follows from logic's ambiguous status as both propaedeutic to and norm of science. Science is only science if reason is properly used and we can only judge sciences if we learn the proper use of reason.

Here, it must be duly noted that the criterion of judgement or presentation of truth is context sensitive. The practical dimension of logic in the *Compendium* introduces students to the different kinds of truth that can be communicated and the proper form of their communication. Accordingly, the *Compendium* did not purvey a 'one size fits all' approach to the various fields of human inquiry. Rather, it taught of the proper use of the intellectual faculties and the way they should relate to the variety of human inquiry and experience. The standards by which we judge a work of human history are quite different from those according to which we judge a work of natural history, for instance.

This emphasis on invention, judgement, presentation and defence all finally indicates that the really practical dimension of logic at this time had to do with i) the identification and hence also avoidance of error and ii) the capacity to *convince* others by means of the strict presentation of truthful conclusions via clear reasoning.⁶⁶ Of course, this would be exceedingly helpful in all areas of human life, it would be useful in the arts and the sciences, in politics and morality. But more significantly, especially for the young student Hegel, it was absolutely essential if he was to defend a dissertation. In fact, the last part of the *Compendium* dealt with 'the rules of disputation'.⁶⁷ This process is summarised by Günter Schenk, 'In a disputation, an opposition is correctly presented and judged. The one who presents the opposition is the opposer (*opponens*); the one who judges it, i.e. discovers wrong or uncertain things in the opponent, is the responder (*respondens*); the *praeses* acts as the adviser of the respondents. The opponent begins the disputation: he must (1) determine the issue; (2) attack the responder by exposing errors of proof, etc.; (3) present the proof briefly and clearly. The responder takes up the argument; he must try to show that the opponent has made a mistake in the matter or in the form of the proof. If he succeeds, he must demand that the opponent neither changes his reasoning nor proves the proposition (the premises) which seem false or uncertain to the responder. The *praeses* intervenes in the disputation if the respondent gets

⁶⁵ Risse, *Die Logik der Neuzeit*, p. 577.

⁶⁶ Schenk, *Das Württembergische Logikkompodium von 1751*, pp. 208-209.

⁶⁷ Schenk, *Das Württembergische Logikkompodium von 1751*, p. 210.

into difficulties, i.e. he must prevent the respondent from rashly agreeing with the opponent'.⁶⁸

The stakes of logic as presented in the *Compendium*, at least for the young Hegel, could not be clearer. Logic was not only the means by which the human being uses their mental functions correctly, it was also, and perhaps primarily, the means by which the young student could properly orient themselves to the thoughts and opinions of others, whether written or spoken which was essential to the art of disputation according to which the truth not only could be presented but also defended and rendered a source of conviction.

Far from a mere introduction or an overly abstract discipline, Hegel was introduced to a way of thinking about logic which emphasised above all its utility and usefulness in the life.⁶⁹ This was because his first introduction to logic was according to the Wolffian paradigm in which theoretical investigation into the operations of the understanding is supplemented and ultimately justified by a subsequent practical demonstration of 'the utility of this doctrine in the investigation of truth, both from experience, by means of a due use of the senses, and from ratiocination, by means of the right use of the understanding: and moreover, its utility in passing judgment on truths, on books, in conviction, in refutation, and in disputation'.⁷⁰

In sum, this logic was how one could find oneself an active and ready participant in a life oriented towards truth and ultimately 'common benefit'. Such a life was not a life of pedantic disputation or the linguistic trickery such that the student would become a modern-day Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. It was rather a life which celebrated with equal measure one's discovery of truth or the proof of one's falsity as it was precisely through the identification of falsity and slopy reasoning that one could draw closer to truth once more.⁷¹ It was this logical system that Hegel first encountered via the *Gymnasium* and the associated institution of the *Landexam*.

With this brief presentation of the *Compendium* a first conclusion about the practical dimensions of logic for the Stuttgart Hegel can be drawn. Firstly, it should be obvious that

⁶⁸ Schenk, *Das Württembergische Logikkompendium von 1751*, p. 210.

⁶⁹ WOLFF, C. **Logic or Rational Thoughts of the Power of the Human Understanding with their Use and Application in the Knowledge and Search of Truth**, p. lxv. There Wolff writes, 'I have undertaken to handle philosophy in such a manner, as shall be of most service to persons in their several future stations and conditions in life'. The criterion of usefulness governs his presentation of the subject. Many of Wolff's followers would consistently emphasise this point, c.f. the discussion of Julius Bernhard von Rohr in Risse, **Die Logik der Neuzeit**, p. 621.

⁷⁰ Wolff, **Logic or Rational Thoughts of the Power of the Human Understanding with their Use and Application in the Knowledge and Search of Truth**, p. lxvi.

⁷¹ Wolff, **Logic or Rational Thoughts of the Power of the Human Understanding with their Use and Application in the Knowledge and Search of Truth**, p. lxx.

logic is immediately a practical affair insofar as it increases our capacity to think in the way God prescribed, that is, according to the innate rules of thought, and therefore correctly. This emphasis on logic as the guide to the correct use of our faculty of reason was a peculiarity, Risse has argued, of the new 'Enlightenment' conception of logic.⁷² Thus, logic is the discipline by which we increase our intellect's capacity to fulfill its proper function and hence are not only true but good. In sum, logic is the instrument by which human reason perfects itself, and practice of rational self-perfection. Further, insofar as we are working with the Wolffian paradigm in which right thought facilitates right action, logic also involves our ability to act morally and achieve happiness. In fact, Wolff saw – contrary to the schools and their 'idle disputation and wrangling' the proper purpose of philosophy to be its contribution to human life and practice.⁷³ Such an emphasis on practice and the closely related 'treatment also of the practical applications of logic' was a characteristic feature of the Wolffian conception of logic despite the various differences amongst his followers.⁷⁴ Thus logic is not only the key to right thought but right action and a great deal of human affairs.

A few final comments about this *Compendium* are worth adding. It must be emphasised that the status of logic as propaedeutic to philosophy is problematic when it comes to this text. The *Compendium* is largely a summary of Wolff's logic, this much is readily admitted by specialists. However, the role of logic in the Wolffian system is not entirely clear. For Wolff, philosophy is concerned with true knowledge of the possibility and reasons of things. It is therefore indispensable that we know how to apprehend truth and avoid falsity, as logic teaches. Logic therefore seems like something we must know and be able to conform to before we engage in philosophy. However, logic is not the source of the principles from which it necessarily begins. Hence logic is, according to Wolff, dependent upon metaphysics which provides these principles. Nevertheless, it is practical, perhaps even necessary, that we become acquainted with the rules of thinking correctly before we move to metaphysics and so the dependent logic is nevertheless used as an introduction to philosophy, a dependent part that it is useful to know before beginning. However, this argument is only made in the '*Discursus*' (i.e., in the Latin Logic). In the '*Vorbericht*' (i.e., in the German Logic) logic is unproblematically presented as the first *part* of philosophy. Hence in Wolff

⁷² Risse, *Die Logik der Neuzeit*, p. 509.

⁷³ WOLFF, C. *Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauch in der Erkenntnis der Wahrheit*, p. lxxvii.

⁷⁴ Risse, *Die Logik der Neuzeit*, p. 616.

himself the question of logic as introduction or propaedeutic is problematic.⁷⁵ Here we find in the very structure of Wolff's philosophy the different visions of philosophy that had been at work in the German school and university systems in the past centuries.⁷⁶ According to the traditional scholastic paradigm which came to dominate educational institutions in the Holy Roman Empire owing to the reforms of Philipp Melancton, logic was the introduction to philosophy.⁷⁷ However, toward the end of the 16th century, thanks to a resurgence of interest in Aristotle and a proliferation of commentaries, the Aristotelian notion of metaphysics as first philosophy came to dominate.⁷⁸ Yet despite this, logic continued to be taught as propaedeutic in the schools.⁷⁹

It could be said that different ways that Wolff frames the role of logic reflect the ambiguous status of logic at a time when scholasticism still held strong in the school system but had very little credibility amongst university professors. The various treatments of Wolff's logic by his followers and students would, depending on the context, emphasise either the pedagogical aspect of the logic or its subordination and dependence to metaphysics.⁸⁰ Thus it must be said that the accent placed on logic as pragmatic introduction to or dependent part of metaphysics was context sensitive and not reflective of any indecision on Wolff's part.

Like Wolff, in composing the *Compendium Layriz* and his translator and editor Knaus had been torn by the competing demands of the new philosophy and the old scholastic

⁷⁵ Moreover, insofar as philosophy's distinction from other forms of human cognition is a result of its method of proceeding, logic is also the method by which philosophy *is* philosophy, or more broadly the method by which sciences are scientific. It would therefore be somewhat misleading to claim that logic is simply an introduction. This 'double meaning' of logic for Wolff is discussed by Risse, **Die Logik der Neuzeit**, p. 587. As Giovanna Luciano demonstrates, this vision of logic (as introduction) is definitely broken with by Hegel in Jena, LUCIANO, G. Critique and Speculation: Reconsidering Hegel's Early Dialectical Logic. **Hegel-Bulletin**, 2022. As she writes, 'the critical role of logic cannot be understood in terms of an introduction to true philosophy'. I concur with this conclusion. However, it must be noted that the introductory character of logic was *already* problematic not only for the Stuttgart Hegel but even within German language philosophy. It is important to highlight the diversity of approaches even among the textbooks that a grammar school student like Hegel encountered. For instance, in Ernesti's *Initia*, discussed below, logic is no longer introductory to but *derived from* metaphysics. Moreover, in Leibniz logic and metaphysics were identical, for a brief history of 'German' logic see POZZO, R. Logic and Metaphysics in German Philosophy from Melancthon to Hegel. In Sweet, W. (Ed). **Approaches to Metaphysics**. London: Kluwer Academic, 2004

⁷⁶ This point is also made in Sales Vilalta, *Entre Schulphilosophie y ciencia moderna - la filosofia de Christian Wolff*, p. 79n72. It must not be concluded that this is a contradiction in Wolff's thought. Once again Risse states the matter well when/by calling the difference one of accent rather than fundamental antithesis, **Die Logik der Neuzeit**, p. 589

⁷⁷ Pozzo, 'Logic and Metaphysics in German Philosophy from Melancton to Hegel', pp. 62–63.

⁷⁸ Sales Vilalta, *Entre Schulphilosophie y ciencia moderna - la filosofia de Christian Wolff*, p. 82.

⁷⁹ Schenk, *Das Württembergische Logikkompndium von 1751*, p. 187.

⁸⁰ Risse, **Der Logik der Neuzeit**, p. 615.

demands of the early education. Knaus in particular, insofar as he sought to turn Layriz' text into a state authorised school textbook had to make it conform rather strictly to the needs of the Württemberg school system; a school system whose structure had not, at the time of Hegel's attendance, changed for around 100 years. As a result, he had to 'make the selection in such a way that logic appears more in its propaedeutic function in order to achieve the goals of the elementary instruction'.⁸¹ Therefore the ambiguities in logic's function in the Wolffian paradigm, as introduction to or first *part of* philosophy depending on whether one followed the *Discursis* or the *Vorbereitung*, are not only inherent in the Wolffian account itself but also exacerbated by the purposes for which the *Compendium* was composed. The propaedeutic function of logic was emphasised for practical and pedagogical purposes, and this would likely have been understood by the young students especially when later classes, such as the latter logic class with Cleß, would go on to show the way logic depended upon metaphysics. It would be a mistake to assume, as many Hegel scholars do, that Hegel's school and university years introduced him to philosophical 'business as usual'.

One further word related to the practical dimensions of this logic. As has already been noted in the introduction, Hegel's school was subject to a great deal of political debate and the content of the curriculum was often shaped in response to decided non-pedagogical concerns. But did the *Compendium* itself have a political background? Before it was introduced, a compendium written by Johann Heinrich Schellenbaur had been the basis for logical instruction since the 17th century. As a result, Knaus was not exaggerating when he claimed that it was necessary to keep up with the spirit of the times, which was the spirit of the Wolffian philosophy. This is the first 'practical' point that must be noted. It was by no means given that the school system of Württemberg would be open to the Wolffian philosophy. In fact, in many other regions, this rationalistic philosophy had been decisively rejected on theological grounds. However, in Württemberg Privy Councillor Georg Bernhard Bilfinger, a friend and loyal follower of Wolff's,⁸² had ensured a place for Wolff's philosophy and had tried to facilitate, not always successfully, a culture of toleration between the rationalist philosophy and the Pietistic religious current which was decidedly dominant in this region.⁸³ Hegel's first logic textbook, in short, indexes the peculiar philosophical, cultural and

⁸¹ Schenk, *Das Württembergische Logikkompendium von 1751*, p. 190.

⁸² TONELLI, G. La filosofía alemana de Leibniz hasta Kant. In: Belaval, Y. (Ed.) **La filosofía alemana de Leibniz a Hegel**. Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1977, pp. 109-110.

⁸³ Franz, *Die Logikkompendien im Herzogtum Württemberg 1559-1793*, p. 222; Spiegel, **Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie**, p. 28.

ultimately political climate of his hometown. That Hegel was introduced to a Wolffian logic at school should not be taken for granted simply because this is one of the names that pre-Kantian German philosophy is associated with. The 'rationalists' had very little influence in the Württemberg school system despite the Duke's best efforts. The adoption of Neo-Humanist textbooks, a final compromise between this Enlightenment tendency and the orthodox Protestant tendency, in actual fact favoured the orthodoxy at the expense of some of the more 'hard-line' or traditional rationalist teachers.⁸⁴

Wolffian logic was therefore unusual to find in the Stuttgart *Gymnasium's* authorised set of textbooks. But why did Knaus choose Layriz' text in particular? There were no shortages of Wolffian textbooks. Knaus had claimed that Layriz' text was recommended above all others. The true superiority of Layriz' text was a result of his placing great emphasis on the pedagogical nature of a work intended for school. Unlike the great rationalist textbooks, Layriz believed that a compendium intended for school must first and foremost assume nothing and lead the child from concrete experience to sophisticated logical concepts. Thus, Layriz had littered his work with a great diversity of 'real world' examples which would facilitate the students' understanding of the subject matter. Knaus, however, greatly abridged Layriz' text, excluding a great deal of this pedagogically motivated content, i.e., the very aspect of Layriz' text which made it stand out amidst the various available introductions to logic. But if not for this reason, then what recommended Layriz's text 'so highly' to Knaus?

Franz has provided the most compelling answer: 'the solution to the riddle lies in the field of politics'.⁸⁵ It is likely, though not fully determinable, that Layriz' text was used as the basis for logical instruction in the Württemberg schools due to the role that Layriz played as envoy for the Herrnhut Brethren who had attempted to find religious protection and toleration in Württemberg. Without getting into the details, their petition was rejected but Layriz was nevertheless a man held in high esteem in Württemberg. It is possible then, Franz concludes, that Layriz' logic was introduced into the school system as a form of 'compensation [*als Ausgleich*]' by the Duchy to Layriz for the trouble caused.⁸⁶

The *Compendium*, therefore, was present in the *Untergymnasium* and hence likely used as the basis for the *Landexamen* not because Layriz' presentation of the Wolffian logic

⁸⁴ This will be discussed below in connection with Ernesti's *Initia*.

⁸⁵ Franz, *Die Logikkompendien im Herzogtum Württemberg 1559-1793*, p. 224.

⁸⁶ Franz, *Die Logikkompendien im Herzogtum Württemberg 1559-1793*, p. 225.

was valued in the school system but for a much more pragmatic reason. Nevertheless, thanks to this entirely pragmatic reason, Hegel's first formal encounter was determined by the Wolffian tradition. This was not the logic of Wolff per se but, due to the old scholastic structure of the *Gymnasium*, the logic of Wolff somewhat modified to fit the old scholastic form. According to the old tradition, logic was treated as an introduction to philosophy. But with the new Wolffian paradigm, logic was also treated as an introduction to philosophy but now only for pragmatic reasons. It is therefore likely, thanks to the *Compendium*, that Hegel already became familiar of logic's dependence – or perhaps identity with, if Leibniz's influence on Wolff is recalled and Wolff's own theory followed to its natural conclusions – on metaphysics. As far as practical issues are concerned, the *Compendium* introduced Hegel to a logic which was constitutively opposed to pedantry and, instead, insisted upon the role that logic and philosophy more generally can play in the realm of human affairs. That is, on logic's usefulness in a range of arenas, and in the more immediate task of public disputation.

3. Logic in the Obergymnasium: Ernesti's Initia philosophiae solidioris

The second manual Hegel used was Ernesti's *Initia philosophiae solidioris* (henceforth *Initia*). While it is still generally situated in the Wolffian frame, it is not a summary – unlike the *Compendium*. Following the scholastic tradition, Ernesti calls logic 'dialectics' which is understood to be the doctrine that guides the intellect to true knowledge by means of concepts, judgements and syllogisms.⁸⁷ His 'principles' are the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason.

In dealing with method, Ernesti distinguishes between the 'mathematical method', presented as a simple schematism of definitions, axioms, postulates and theorems, and the 'mathematical demonstration', presented as a chain of syllogisms founded on unprovable propositions, i.e. definitions, axioms and postulate. In general, the 'demonstration' is distinguished from the 'syllogism' precisely because it must not only be formally correct, but also certain of the truth of its premises.⁸⁸ In this sense it does not differ greatly from the *Compendium*.

Despite these similarities, which are really a consequence of their both being firmly situated in the scholastic tradition,⁸⁹ there are some notable differences between the two texts.

⁸⁷ Or it is the science of seeing truth and falsity acutely, and of explaining it accurately. Ernesti, *Initia*, §2, p. 294.

⁸⁸ Risse, *Die Logik der Neuzeit*, p. 707.

⁸⁹ Pozzo, 'Introductio', p. 11.

Pozzo claims that the primary difference between the two consists in Ernesti's greater insistence on the 'psychological basis' of the logical or dialectical operations. This is certainly the case. But Pozzo did not emphasise precisely how different Ernesti's presentation of the relationship of the *parts* of philosophy is.⁹⁰

While the *Compendium* presented logic as the discipline preceding and making possible metaphysics, Ernesti reverses this long established and upheld order.⁹¹ In *Initia*, metaphysics *precedes* logic. This means that logic is based upon metaphysics which includes psychology ontology, and natural theology.⁹² Why does he do this? Because, Ernesti argues, 'there are in Psychology and Ontology the principles of every dialectical discipline'.⁹³ Thus logic is based upon both psychology and ontology (and not only upon psychological operations as Pozzo maintains).

This does not have too many profound consequences in Ernesti's presentation. Logic is still understood as the science by which one comes to accurately differentiate the true from the false (knowing how and why they differ from one another) and the art through which one wins people over to the truth through the clarity, order and choice of one's arguments.⁹⁴ It therefore upholds the same general function that logic had in the *Compendium*.

But here the basis of logic in metaphysics comes into play. According to Ernesti, to properly understand what logic is, we must understand that there are two types of truths. There are objective and subjective truths. Objective truth is attributed to things themselves. Subjective truth is in the human mind. Significantly, logic is considered by Ernesti to deal only with subjective truth, that is, with truths of or for the human senses and the human intellect.

This might make it seem as though Pozzo is correct after all to suggest that logic in Ernesti is based only on psychology. Subjective truth, however, only exists when objective truths are rightly understood, and therefore psychology *and* ontology must be considered. That is, subjective truth is the agreement of our perceptions and judgements with those things

⁹⁰ This is likely due to Pozzo's having relied almost entirely on Risse's comments on Ernesti which total only a single paragraph, *Die Logik der Neuzeit*, p. 707.

⁹¹ Ernesti notes that this will surprise his readers in the preface, *Initia*.

⁹² Ernesti, *Initia*. He claims that natural theology was added for completeness and does not underpin logic.

⁹³ Ernesti, *Initia*.

⁹⁴ Ernesti, *Initia*, §2, p. 294.

that are objectively true. In this sense then, logic's 'highest function' is to teach us to judge the correctness of our thoughts which means their agreement with objective truths.⁹⁵

Thus, logic is the means by which we can come to bring our subjective perceptions and judgements (our psychological state) into accord with things as they really are; the truth of things having been established in metaphysics.⁹⁶ It thus has three tasks, which are merely perfections of the three functions of the faculty of cognition that are already determined in psychology.⁹⁷ First it will show us the proper method in the formation of concepts. Second, it will show the correct method in forming judgements. Third, it will explain the laws that must govern reasoning.⁹⁸

Here we have a rather unorthodox-orthodox vision of the role of logic in philosophy. As in the *Compendium*, logic helps us on the path to truth through acquainting us with concepts, judgements and reasoning (syllogising). But it does so now no longer as the 'propaedeutic' to metaphysics but only after some basic truths about the objective universe and the human faculty of cognition have been discerned and decided. It then helps to mediate these two 'metaphysical objects' (being and mind) by ensuring the best or proper use of the three functions of our faculty of cognition.

No great conclusions about Hegel's encounter with this logic can be drawn. In essence, the practical dimension of the logic that Hegel was taught in Class VI and VII remained the same as those that he drew from his early studies of the *Compendium* for the *Landexam*. Two points are, however, worth highlighting. First, it is significant that this presentation of logic as dialectic retained its relationship to the ancient art of disputation. Of course, this is not yet the notion of dialectic at work in Kant's *KrV* nor is it Platonic dialectic. It is, however, Ciceronian, which shows that from at least his time in Stuttgart, logic was not simply a formal discipline. Thanks to the constant reference to Cicero in Ernesti's manual, logic was intimately connected with the struggle of debate.

Secondly, already as early as Stuttgart, Hegel encountered alternative models of logic which challenged not only the scholastic ordering of the philosophical sciences but also the

⁹⁵ '[W]hat is true or false cannot be judged unless it is understood what a thing is, and by what nature it is (Ontol. §. 32. coll. 4)', Ernesti, *Initia*, §5, p. 296 Here the dependence of logic (subjective truth) upon objective truth (ontology) as well as the corresponding reference of the dialectic section to the section on metaphysics is plain to see.

⁹⁶ For this discussion refer to Ernesti, *Initia*, §3, p. 295.

⁹⁷ These three functions are fashioning and forming concepts (*formandarum effingendaruinqu notionum*), judging (*iudicandi*) and reasoning (*ratiocnandi*), Ernesti, *Initia*, §39, p. 135. [why not list the latin in the text? Otherwise you're doubling up the information without reason]

⁹⁸ Ernesti, *Initia*, §4, p. 296.

relationship of logic to metaphysics. These models showed that logic was nothing without, and perhaps nothing but, an extension of metaphysics insofar as the forms of human understanding are concerned.

A further note can also be made about Ernesti more generally with relevance to the young Hegel. Ernesti founded biblical hermeneutics in Germany and was greatly inspired in this work by the theories of language developed in the work of both Étienne Bonnot de Condillac and John Locke.⁹⁹ That Hegel was taught logic from one of his textbooks demonstrates just how non-traditional the material used for his education was, and likely indicates the sort of person his lecturer Cleß was too. His use of *Initia* as a manual should indicate that reading the young Hegel's educational trajectory according to the usual orthodox instruction/unorthodox private reading, or conservative teacher/radical student binaries is far from clarificatory.¹⁰⁰

Much like the *Compendium*, Ernesti's book was not adopted because of its inherent excellence as a teaching manual. Unfortunately, less details are available about its use compared to the *Compendium*.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions about the practical context in which Ernesti's *Initia* was introduced.

Ernesti was, during his own time, primarily known as a philologist and classicist who worked on Cicero. He, along with Johann Mathhias Gesner who Ernesti succeeded as rector at the St. Thomas School in Leipzig, was a pioneer of neohumanism (or perhaps simply a pioneer of a revival of humanism in the modern age)¹⁰² which became a dominant educational philosophy in the latter part of the 18th century. It was opposed to the other prevailing educational philosophies - such as orthodox Protestant Scholasticism, Rationalism and Pietism - but primarily defined itself against what it considered to be the pedantry of scholasticism. Here the dry and laborious memorisation of grammar tables and linguistic intricacy was to be replaced by an emphasis on the spirit of the author and the noble thoughts of the ancients. Language study was not an end in itself according to Ernesti and Gesner. Such

⁹⁹ As noted in FORSTER, M.N. *Hermeneutics Francophone Approaches*. In Forster, M.N., & Gjesdal, K. (Eds.). **The Cambridge Companion to Hermeneutics**. London: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 263–64.

¹⁰⁰ Spiegel concurs on this point with regard to the use of Ernest already in his monumental study of the Stuttgart period, see Spiegel, **Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie**, p. 27.

¹⁰¹ The manual is not mentioned in the work of Franz or Schenk, likely because Franz' volume only deals with Hölderlin and Schelling's time in Stuttgart and not Hegel's. This is due, Franz explains, to the editors believing at the time that the story about Hegel's youth had already been written comprehensively.

¹⁰² On the problems associated with the term neohumanism and its implied opposition to humanism, which the author convincingly shows to be based on a caricature of classical humanism, see VAN BOMMEL, B. **Classical Humanism and the Challenge of Modernity: Debates on Classical Education in 19th Century Germany**. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015.

an approach could only produce loathing (*Ekel*) for the ancient languages and authors, causing students 'to waste their entire lives on things of no consequence so that nothing truly useful either for the higher sciences or for life comes of it'.¹⁰³

In contrast to this, the neohumanists emphasised the importance of the ancient authors for the *present*, that is, for their potential usefulness with regard to the 'higher sciences' or 'life'. Pedagogically they therefore encouraged *reading* the texts rather than dissecting them, seeing the language as part of an artful work, an argumentative whole, a thought.¹⁰⁴ Whereas, according to scholastic education, a whole year could be spent on a single book of Cicero's letters, the neohumanist instead would read these 'in a mere six weeks'.¹⁰⁵ All in all, the neohumanist was concerned much more with making the ancients relevant and living to the concerns of the present than the scholastics, and, for that matter, the philhellenes.¹⁰⁶

Here it is probable that the reader may sense a striking parallel with the framing that the Wolffian logic. In both instances the *usefulness* of study was emphasised at the expense of the pedantry of traditional scholastic education.¹⁰⁷ This is not to say, of course, that Hegel's teachers themselves subscribed to these pedagogical principles and there were certainly a few who preferred the old ways. Cleß, who taught logic from Ernesti's *Initia*, was not one of them however. It is therefore safe to conclude that Hegel was not only taught logic from a neohumanist textbook, from which he was also taught rhetoric, but also in a neohumanist style, or at least in a modern spirit.¹⁰⁸ It is also significant to note that in his *Tagebuch* (a diary Hegel kept while at the Gymnasium and in which he records certain reflections about subjects that interested him) Hegel refers to Gesner and displays interest in his pedagogical

¹⁰³ GESNER, J.M. **Enchiridion sive prudentia privata ac civilis**. Göttingen, 1745, p. iii-iv.

¹⁰⁴ Their approach can be summarised thusly, 'first, right understanding; second, a feeling for the excellence and beauty of the language and thought; above all ... that students understand the context of the whole and how to handle it', c.f. PAULSEN, F. **Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts auf den deutschen Schulen und Universitäten vom Ausgang des Mittelalters bis zur Gegenwart**. Leipzig: Veit und Comp Verlag, 1885, p. 24.

¹⁰⁵ LEGAPSI, M.C. **The Death of Scripture and the Rise of Biblical Studies**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 66.

¹⁰⁶ Legaspi, **The Death of Scripture and the Rise of Biblical Studies**, p. 61.

¹⁰⁷ Neohumanism has been characterised as 'anti-utilitarian' in HOWARD, T.A., **Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 138. However it must be noted that usefulness (*Brauchbarkeit*, *Nützlichkeit* or *Nutzen*) were 'said in many ways'. Usefulness took on a decidedly negative valence in the 19th century and became connected to material gain and job or vocation-preparedness. In the 18th century things were not so simple. During this period use had a broader significance and, in the words of Van Bommel, 'The truly 'useful' member of society was the man who, having developed public responsibility, was capable of contributing to society at large', **Classical Humanism and the Challenge of Modernity**. Usefulness was linked less to pragmatic concerns and more to 'the common good [*Gemeinnützigkeit*]'. This same conception is present in Wolff.

¹⁰⁸ Spiegel, **Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie**, pp. 38-39.

ideas. This may evidence the impact this educational philosophy, likely modelled by Cleß, had on the young man.

Thus, one conclusion can be stated about the practical context for this early encounter with logic: Ernesti's *Initia* evidences the rise and influence of neohumanist pedagogy in the schools, an aspect of Hegel's early education that has been under investigated. However, it must be asked, why neohumanism?

The obvious answer would be that it represented the most 'progressive' teaching philosophy of its day and hence was embraced by the Duke and the enlightened teachers he filled the teaching positions in the gymnasium with. However, this would beg the question: progressive by what measure? Pedagogically their approach is perhaps less mind numbingly boring, but this is not the only measure for progress. The Duke certainly favoured progress and had an interest in improving schools in his duchy. But his were not the only desires or concerns which governed the school. As I already noted in the opening the *Konsistorium* also had a stake in the nature of the *Gymnasium* and its education. They also exercised authority and hence their concerns could not be wholly ignored on matters of textbooks, teachers, and teaching philosophy. This latter point is particularly important if the presence of Ernesti's textbook and the role of neohumanism in the *Gymnasium* is to be properly understood.

While a Wolffian manual was tolerated in the school, the rationalism of Wolff and his Enlightenment ilk did not sit well with the representatives of Protestant Orthodoxy in Württemberg. This gives all the more credence to Franz' claim that Layritz' text was introduced more as a gesture of good will to its author, and not because of its pedagogical superiority. The reports of the *Konsistorium*'s visitations to the *Gymnasium* (1775–1781), and later descriptions of the situation in the school by Senior Professor Haug (1785–86) and those of Rector Tafinger (1794), evidence a 'a policy of doctrinal uncompromisingness towards religious rationalism and benevolence towards the neohumanist spirit'.¹⁰⁹ In fact, in 1777, during Hegel's time in the *Gymnasium*, a theological manual of a notorious antirationalist, Christian Friedrich Sartorius, was introduced as the basis for teaching theology. It should then not be concluded that the changes that Hegel's schooling underwent were in favour of enlightenment, reason or freedom. So how did neohumanism fit into this?

That the *Konsistorium* adopted a benevolent attitude toward this educational philosophy might seem like an irony of history given Ernesti and the neohumanists' role in

¹⁰⁹ Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 26.

founding and facilitating the growth of a new hermeneutics (historical-critical) which would undermine the traditional approach to the bible.¹¹⁰ However, this fateful development had not yet taken place. To the *Konsistorium*, the neohumanists represented perfect allies against the excesses of enlightened rationalism and the implicit or explicit threat that they posed to traditional Christian beliefs.¹¹¹ This is because, unlike the philhellenes, the neohumanists did not glorify the ancients to denigrate the present nor did they celebrate paganism at the expense of Christianity. The neohumanist teaching was one of conciliation. If asked the age-old question, 'what has Athens to do with Jerusalem?', the neohumanist Gesner would answer with an equally rhetorical question, 'What could be more wholesome for tender, young minds than to place in their hands, along with the books of religion, the writings of the greatest men of all time, of Cicero, Caesar, and the rest?'¹¹²

For the neohumanist both the ancients and the moderns were sources of education and contributed toward the cultivation of *humanitas*. In fact, they believed that the ancient teachings 'reinforced Christian faith'.¹¹³ It was precisely this attitude that the rationalist teachers of the Gymnasium detested, but unfortunately, they did not have enough sway to truly combat the growth of this new tendency.¹¹⁴

In sum then, the presence of Ernesti's *Initia* in Hegel's classroom is the outcome of the ongoing conflict between the enlightening interests of the Duke, the teachers in the *Gymnasium* and the conservative interests of the *Konsistorium*. During a period in which reason and faith, progress and tradition seemed increasingly opposed and the very fabric of religious orthodoxy was threatened, neohumanism appeared as a perfect middle path. As Spiegel writes,

Protestant orthodoxy saw in New Humanism - i.e., an intellectual current that did not pit the need for rationality, newly awakened in the "*siècle des lumières*," against tradition, but advocated a rational approach to classical thought - a potential ally against extreme rationalist tendencies in

¹¹⁰ Howard, **Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University**, p. 308; Legapsi, **The Death of Scripture and the Rise of Biblical Studies**, p. 6.

¹¹¹ Gesner's books were introduced but Basedow's Enlightenment tracts considered dangerous, see LANG, G. **Geschichte der Stuttgarter Gelehrtenschule von ihren ersten Anfängen bis zum Jahre 1806**. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1928, p. 248. [who is Basedow? Not mentioned before, completely out of context]

¹¹² Quoted in GRAFFMAN, H. **Die Stellung der Religion im Neuhumanismus**. Gottingen, 1929, p. 31.

¹¹³ Legapsi, **The Death of Scripture and the Rise of Biblical Studies**, p. 60.

¹¹⁴ Spiegel, **Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie**, p. 28.

contemporary theology, all of which aimed at undermining the authority of biblical tradition as divine revelation.¹¹⁵

Once again, as was the case with the *Compendium*, the very materials which formed the basis of Hegel's early education bear the marks of a deep and ongoing social conflict. Logic, which is seemingly the most abstract of disciplines is shown to be the plaything of concrete political circumstance, faction and compromise.

4. *Logic in the Gymnasium: Some Conclusions*

The logic to which Hegel was introduced at the gymnasium was largely Wolffian and taught broadly in terms of the Protestant scholastic tradition according to which logic and rhetoric were complimentary subjects which prepared the student for an active and living engagement with the world. It can be conjectured, on the basis of statements made by Hegel later in his life, that these texts had a great influence upon him. His comments about knowing Wolff's logic have already been noted. But in addition to this, in 1822, when the Prussian Minister for Worship and Public Education, Baron von Altenstein, expressed concern about the insufficient schooling that *Gymnasium* students were receiving in logic, Hegel replied:

According to my impartial opinion, the whole purpose and manner of this treatment [of logic in *Gymnasia*] could be fulfilled if teachers were only advised to return to the old textbooks, which were mostly written by exponents of the Wolffian school, and to limit themselves, in a certain sense, only to substituting Kant's table of categories for Aristotle's in the appropriate places.¹¹⁶

In addition to this, Lorenzo Sala has convincingly argued that there is much in Hegel's treatment of logic that suggests a deeper proximity to the logic of Wolff (or at least Wolffian logic) than is traditionally thought.¹¹⁷ While neither Sala nor I argue that Hegel is simply a Wolffian or a 'pre-critical metaphysician', a characterisation that is often not entirely clear in the literature, there are enough parallels and lines of influence in his later philosophy to pursue a serious investigation into his early engagement with this tradition.

As far as the practical dimensions of Hegel's encounter with logic in the *Gymnasium* are concerned, a variety of conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, it must be noted that Hegel

¹¹⁵ Spiegel, *Zur Entstehung der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 25.

¹¹⁶ G. W. F. Hegel. *Über den Unterricht in der Philosophie auf Gymnasien* (1822). In Hoffmeister, J. (ed.). *Berliner Schriften (1818–1831)*. Hamburg: Meiner, 1956, p. 553.

¹¹⁷ SALA, L. Hegel's Cocktail: From Metaphysics to Logic and Back Again. *Australasian Philosophical Review*, vol. 2, n. 4, 2018.

encountered logic in accordance with a broadly Wolffian tradition in the *Compendium* which he studied for his *Landexam*. Logic for the young Hegel was hence a discipline which taught the correct use of the human powers of understanding in the discernment or presentation of truths. It was also a way of conceiving logic which emphasised utility and its practical application. This aspect of logic would no doubt have been at the forefront of Hegel's mind during his time at the Gymnasium insofar as his course of study necessitated his engagement in forms of public disputation, an art also taught as a practical part of logic.

Perhaps a little more speculatively, this logic introduced Hegel to the notion that reason was at work in general human activity, a point he would press constantly against those who enthusiastically and wrongly thought they championed *mere* feeling.¹¹⁸ Reason was also perfected by way of self-conscious reflection such that, at least in the arena of spirit, we can be more or less reasonable the more or less self-consciously we take up questions about our own reasonableness. That is, this teaching acquainted him with the commitment to a vision of logic and hence of reason as the nature of human beings, and as something we can learn to improve. Logic and the philosophy of reason taught that reason was not a possession but an activity, measured by its function and effects.¹¹⁹

Secondly, it must be recalled that the very conditions of Hegel's encounter with logic were themselves practical. For all the talk about 'the practical dimensions of Hegel's philosophy', very little is often said about the real interpersonal, institutional and political-ideological factors that might have been at work to shape Hegel's reception of certain figures and works. That Hegel encountered Layritz' *Compendium* rather than another was a consequence of *realpolitik*; an intolerant religious decision and a subsequent gesture of respect which was made possible in no small part due to the fact that Wolff had some friends in high places.

As far as the *Initia* is concerned these same conclusions hold generally. Though here again the question of the status and role of logic, as introduction to or dependent part of philosophy, are introduced to Hegel in a way that make them stand out (especially in contrast to the *Compendium* where Wolff's claim that logic, though dependent on metaphysics, nevertheless ought to be pragmatically used as a propaedeutic is preferred to the 'metaphysics

¹¹⁸ See for instance, the comments in the preface to the *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*.

¹¹⁹ 'But one cannot know the powers of the human mind in any other way than by experience, in which we use them', WOLFF, C. **Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erketniss der Wahrheit**, p. ii.

first approach' for reasons of the structure of the Gymnasium). Additionally, logic is here taught as dialectic according to an author who himself was primarily a scholar of classical languages. This no doubt had important consequences for Hegel's own views about the relationship between logic and grammar, between reason and the parts of speech. Moreover, here too the practical context of this logic is as interesting as the logic itself. The quasi-monopoly that the *Initia* held over philosophy reveals much about the contestations that took place over the nature and content of education in the Württemberg school system. The prevalence of this neohumanist textbook which was welcomed by the *Konsistorium* might also, though this can only be indicated here, give us some insight into Hegel's own relationship to that old quarrel between the ancients and moderns and more generally into his early attitudes about the relationship between reason and faith, enlightenment and religion.

Far from being something that Hegel began to only seriously consider during his time at university (the *Tübingen Stift* 1788–1793) or later teaching in Jena (1801–1807), logic was absolutely central to Hegel's learning and thinking from the young age of ten years old when he took his first *Landexam*. His instruction was systematic, comprehensive and it thrust questions of the role and status of logic, metaphysics and reason to the forefront of his mind. More generally the nature of this logical instruction can offer us a window not only into the specific theory of judgements to which the young man was introduced but also into the strange circumstances according to which a Wolffian and neohumanist textbook came to find themselves in his classrooms. Not only were these logics themselves 'practical', which is to say directed toward the concreteness of everyday life, but they bore the marks of the struggle over the nature of instruction in the Württemberg school system. Finally, in addition to insight into these matters, this article has corrected some of the biographical confusions pertaining to Hegel's early logical instruction and the authorship of the *Compendium* which still persist thanks to the influence of Pozzo's otherwise excellent account of the young Hegel's logical instruction.

Formal Logical Instruction Timeline

1776	Enters <i>Untergymnasium</i>				
1780	First <i>Landexam</i>	Logic	is	tested,	instruction
	<i>Compendium</i>				
	at <i>Gymnasium</i> informs content				

1784	Enters <i>Obergymnasium</i>	
1784–86	Class VI	Logic classes with Cleß
	<i>Initia</i>	
1786–88	Class VII	Logic classes with Cleß
	<i>Initia</i>	

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