

From a Ladder to a mere Rung: The Functions of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* within or without the *Encyclopedia*¹

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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I explore the distinct functions that Hegel assigns to the Jena *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) and to the *Encyclopedia*'s 'Phenomenology of Spirit'. Whereas the 1807 *Phenomenology* can be seen as a ladder bringing natural consciousness up to the level of philosophical knowledge, the *Encyclopedia* Phenomenology seems demoted to a mere rung, a mere step or a subsection within Hegel's definitive system, stuck between the sections on Anthropology and Psychology. Does that entail that what was once (in 1807) conceived as the first part of Hegel's system of science has become secondary in importance in regards to the Logic which constitutes the first part of Hegel's *Encyclopedia*? I argue against such a view that it is important to distinguish the Jena *Phenomenology* from the *Encyclopedia*'s, in order to understand how they both serve different purposes which remained to the end of the highest importance in regards to the general economy of Hegel's final system. This in turn implies that we have two distinct 'phenomenological' moments within Hegel's system that need to be appraised in their own right.

KEYWORDS: *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807); Phenomenology; Propaedeutic; System.

History conveys a certain irony, even if Hegel himself would find such an assertion desperately romantic. Such irony can be found in the historical reception of Hegel's own work. Whereas for most of 'our' contemporaries, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) certainly constitutes his *opus magnum*, (alongside the *Science of Logic*), and is definitely the primary reference for most Hegel Scholars; for 'Hegel's own' contemporaries, if not for Hegel himself, the Jena *Phenomenology* was often seen at odd with its systematic philosophy best captured in his *Encyclopedia*.² John Michael Petry even goes as far as to say that although Hegel "never completely rejected the work [...] nor did he ever encourage anyone to take it very seriously".³ According to Petry, after the publication of the Jena *Phenomenology*, Hegel sought to integrate his theory of consciousness in a more orderly fashion within his systematic writings,

¹ This is the written version of a paper presented during the "Hegel 250 anos: Fenomenologia, Lógica e Sistema/ Hegel 250 years on: Phenomenology, Logic, and System" Conference. It sometime retains a spoken form. Please indulge the author. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their precious remarks which have undoubtedly improved the present paper, any remaining shortcomings are entirely my own.

² PETRY, M. J. Introduction. In: Hegel. **The Berlin Phenomenology**, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981, p. xvii, n. 16.

³ PETRY. Introduction, p. xvii.



distinguishing between phenomenology proper, psychology and then, the realm of social relations which belonged to what Hegel calls the ‘objective’ spirit, which encompasses both the spheres of morals and justice.⁴ What had initially been considered as a ‘ladder’, following Hegel’s expression which H.S. Harris revived in his great commentary of the *Phenomenology*⁵ – a ladder which allowed the reader to raise herself up to the level of philosophy, thus became a mere rung, a single piece in the general economy of Hegel’s great system of philosophy. Initially considered as “the *preparation* for science”⁶ and the “coming-to-be of *Science as such* or of *knowledge*”.⁷ the *Phenomenology*, ‘integrated’ within the encyclopedic system seemed demoted to a mere step, as a subsection stuck between the sections on Anthropology and Psychology in Hegel’s philosophy of Subjective Spirit.

Following this line of interpretation, the 1807 *Phenomenology* stands in an ambiguous relation to Hegel’s final system. For Houlgate, for instance, its task is to bring natural consciousness up to the level of Hegel’s speculative philosophy which truly begins with the *Logic*. Indeed, discussing the issues of proper philosophy without prior training runs the risks of misconstruing the issues at stake within the philosophical debates and confusing philosophical and pseudo-philosophical questions. This is what Hegel underlined for instance in his critique of Krug, a forefront figure of common sense’s attempt at philosophy, which Hegel consequently accused of mistaking Fichte’s transcendental ego for an empirical ego, thus reducing transcendental philosophy to a kind of psychologism condemned to the infinite task of explaining our endless states of consciousness.⁸ To avoid such mistake, ordinary consciousness, what Hegel calls ‘natural consciousness’, must be subjected to a certain transformation in order to properly proceed on the path of speculative philosophy. But, according to Houlgate, it would not be entirely necessary to a seasoned reader of modern philosophy:

[T]he *Phenomenology* does not provide the only possible route into speculative philosophy. Those who are prepared to suspend their ordinary certainties can bypass the *Phenomenology* and proceed directly to the *Logic*. Hegel

⁴ See WESTPHAL, K. R. *Hegel’s Civic Republicanism*. New York: Routledge, 2020.

⁵ See HARRIS, H. S. *Hegel’s Ladder (2 vol.)*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997. See also HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 14-15, § 26; HOULGATE, S. *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*. London: Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 6.

⁶ Hegel’s advertisement for the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* quoted by PETRY, Introduction. p. xvi.

⁷ HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 15, § 27.

⁸ HEGEL. “Wie der gemeine Menschenverstand die Philosophie nehme – dargestellt an den Werken des Herrn Krug“, in Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, IV. Hamburg: Félix Meiner, 1968, p. 185.

believes that many people can be persuaded to give up their ‘presuppositions and prejudices’ by studying the history of modern philosophy.⁹

The question then remains as to determine to what extent the *Phenomenology* still retain its function as a “*preparation for science*” that would then be accomplished in Hegel’s *Encyclopedia*? Is it merely a preparation for the ‘ordinary consciousness’ that often “shares the conviction of [...] the pre-Kantian metaphysician”?¹⁰ But then, what would motivate such an ordinary consciousness to undergo such a “*pathway of doubt*” and a “*way of despair*”?¹¹

Is it even necessary to introduce ‘natural consciousness’ to the realm of speculative philosophy? According to Harris, Hegel’s “*Encyclopedia* contains a ‘Science’ which no longer accepts the need or the duty to justify itself to common sense. It no longer requires the complete comprehension of ‘experience’ (the embracing of all of its own scientific content in a sequence of concrete ‘shapes’ or *embodied* concepts) in another ‘Science’ as its ‘first part’. The *Encyclopedia* is a *complete* account of ‘philosophical science’. It *can* stand alone without the companion piece provided by the ‘Science of consciousness’”.¹² But if one can ‘bypass the *Phenomenology*’ and proceed directly to the encyclopedic system which begins with the *Logic*, are the general developments of the Jena *Phenomenology* merely incorporated into the third part of the *Encyclopedia*? As such, the 1807 *Phenomenology* could be seen as a genial yet unpolished attempt to provide a philosophical account of consciousness. Because of its genius, the Jena *Phenomenology* would still be widely read today with interest, but because of its unpolished character it would allegedly have been more or less discarded by Hegel and his students who would have rather provided an account of consciousness through a philosophy of subjective spirit, within the third and final section of the *Encyclopedia*. As such, the *Encyclopedia*’s *Phenomenology* (with Psychology, parts of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, and parts of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Absolute Spirit*) would have more or less taken over the various developments and insights of the Jena *Phenomenology* not only on the nature of consciousness, but also on politics, morals, art and religion.

Such a standpoint should however be balanced by the fact that, at the very end of his life, only a year after the third and last edition of his *Encyclopedia*, Hegel was still working on a

⁹ HOULGATE, S. *The Opening of Hegel’s Logic*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2006, p. 146.

¹⁰ HOULGATE. *The Opening of Hegel’s Logic*. p. 145.

¹¹ HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 49, §78.

¹² HARRIS. *Hegel’s Ladder*, I, p. 12.

reedition of his 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*.¹³ This, in a sense, tends to show that, for Hegel, the Jena *Phenomenology* still retained a certain relevance that was not reducible to the Phenomenology as found ‘within’ the *Encyclopedia*. Against the idea then, that one Phenomenology (the *Encyclopedia*’s Phenomenology which took place ‘within’ the system) took over another (the Jena *Phenomenology* which was initially the first part or the pathway to the system), I would like to consider the idea that Hegel conferred to both phenomenologies distinct functions and roles in relation to the general economy of the system which let them coexist in their own right in relation to Hegel’s final system.

But I should now clarify that such a task cannot be cogently fulfilled in 20-or-so pages-long paper. One should rather consider this paper as a preliminary work taking place in the larger context of a research on the relation between the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807 and the Phenomenology section of the *Encyclopedia*. Such research and the general idea according to which we should understand Hegel’s final system as having two phenomenologies whose functions and positions in relation the general economy of the system are quite distinct should be further sustained by a careful comparative reading of both Phenomenology showing how they differ in content and meaning and how these differences are clarified in light of their functions. But before one attempts to fulfill such a task, it is essential to first establish the project’s relevance. All the more since it is quite easy to overlook the importance of such a task. Indeed, one must, in my view, avoid the easy misstep which consists of reading one *Phenomenology* into the other, just as we often tend to see both the greater and lesser *Logics* as more or less equivalent.

Accordingly, what I present here are general arguments as to why both the Jena and the *Encyclopedia* Phenomenology can coexist within Hegel’s final system without repeating or overstepping on each other. This thesis should of course be sustained by a thorough comparison between both phenomenologies. In the present paper however, I shall rather consider the general function one can respectively assign to both phenomenologies by focusing on the various introductory remarks (prefaces, introductions, *Vorbegriff*) in which Hegel presents the general architecture of his system in relation to the 1807 *Phenomenology*.

¹³ PINKARD, T. *Hegel. A Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 655.

Indeed, before one can tackle head-on a comparative study of the both phenomenologies and their respective content and function in relation to the system, we have to address the issue of the beginning of a properly scientific system of philosophy, especially since Hegel has put such extensive thoughts on the subject.

Even when one merely considers the relation between the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic* at a time where Hegel still took the *Phenomenology* to be the first part and introduction to his system, the issue is complicated to solve and gave (and still gives) way to multiple and opposite interpretations.¹⁴ But we can generally maintain the consistency of Hegel's project, as Fischbach argues¹⁵, by showing how the *Phenomenology*, one way or another (again, very different arguments have been made on the subject) constitutes a scientific initiation to science itself. The difficulties increase however when we consider the *Phenomenology* in relation to *Encyclopedia* which argues for a "a total absence of presupposition".¹⁶ Hegel continues: "Strictly speaking, in the resolve that *wills pure thought*, this requirement is accomplished by freedom which, abstracting from everything, grasps its pure abstraction, the

¹⁴ On these different interpretations, see STERN, R. Introduction. In STERN, R. (ed.). *G.W.F. Hegel. Critical Assessments*, vol. 3. London: Routledge, 1993, p.2-8. Stern distinguishes between those interpretations that tend to downgrade the importance of the *Phenomenology* in relation to Hegel's later and somewhat more systematic work (Haering, Petry) and those who consider the *Phenomenology* as "coherently planned" and "meant to have a permanent and crucial role" within Hegel's thought (Ibid., p.2, see for instance PIPPIN, R. *Hegel's Idealism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 109). If we generally see the *Phenomenology* as a propaedeutic, is it detachable or not from the rest of the system itself? And if the *Phenomenology* is meant to have a justificatory role within Hegel's encyclopedic system, what is the nature of this role? Does it serve as an epistemological foundation of Hegel's ontology as it presents itself in the *Logic* and how so? By way of a transcendental argument as Pippin would have it (see PIPPIN, *Hegel's Idealism*. p. 38, 124) or through the ascension to a God-like perspective on the unity between subject and object? Could the *Phenomenology* not be rather an attempt to unravel the ungrounded metaphysical assumptions unknowingly assumed by ordinary consciousness, so as to show the necessity of a logical investigation into the nature of such metaphysical assumptions? As Stern states: "On this view, the aim of the *Phenomenology* is not transcendental but therapeutic: the project is to show, not that reality must conform to our concepts, but that in our thinking on many matters – epistemology included – we are led into confusion by a certain metaphysical picture" (STERN. Introduction. p. 7). It is not my purpose solve or even argue for a determinate position here against concurrent positions. I can nonetheless say that I take the *Phenomenology* to be a scientific introduction that acts as a 'propaedeutic' to Hegel's system. As a propaedeutic, it is neither entirely detachable from the system, neither entirely integrated to said system. It is essentially meant to bring the reader (philosophically trained or not) to take the leap into the realm of pure thinking and speculative philosophy. The necessity of such a step is shown through the phenomenological progress of a generic natural consciousness we – the reader – can conceive as our own at a given time of our own experience of reality. This phenomenological journey spells out both the 'epistemological' conditions of possibility of pure logic and pure thinking for a given consciousness and the 'therapeutical' necessity of such a leap into pure logic in order to ground those metaphysical assumptions commonly used with lack of clarity and distinction in everyday life.

¹⁵ FISCHBACH, F. *Du Commencement en philosophie*. Paris: Vrin, 1999, p. 177-78

¹⁶ HEGEL. *Logic. Being Part one of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*. Trans. W. Wallace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 112, § 78.

simplicity of thought.”¹⁷ The necessity of this “pathway of *doubt*, or more precisely [...] the way of despair”¹⁸ that constitutes the phenomenology of consciousness’s experience is thus put in perspective by the possibility of a simple resolve anchored in our own freedom to will ‘pure thought’, to think purely without any presupposition.

For some, this resolution to the problem of the beginning of the system of science put forth in the *Vorbegriff* implies a major revision of the status of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in relation to the system. For Heidegger and Marcuse as we shall see, the *Phenomenology* ceases to be the scientific introduction to the system of science itself and merely becomes a subsection of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit section of the *Encyclopedia*. For Bourgeois or Fischbach on the other hand, the *Encyclopedia Phenomenology* cannot replace the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* “for the simple reason that they both answer to different, and even opposite projects”.¹⁹ On this point, as we shall see, I am in full agreement with Bourgeois and Fischbach. However, for both of them, the *Vorbegriff* nonetheless replaces the *Phenomenology* as the pathway to the system. The *Phenomenology*’s role within the system is neither to be the introductory first part of the system nor to be a mere subsection of the last part of the encyclopedic system²⁰, but to offer an alternate reading of the encyclopedic system as a whole following Geraets’s famous interpretation of the three syllogisms of the Absolute found in the closing paragraphs (§574-577) of the *Encyclopedia*²¹.

In all cases, the *Phenomenology* seems to lose its specific role as a ladder to the system to the hand of the *Vorbegriff*. While in general agreement with Bourgeois and Fischbach that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Encyclopedia Phenomenology* serve quite different purposes while remaining parts of the system to the end, I disagree, for reasons that I cannot fully

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 49, §78.

¹⁹ FISCHBACH, F. *Du Commencement en philosophie*. Paris: Vrin, 1999, p. 181-82 n. 2.

²⁰ The last part of the encyclopedic system which pertains to the Philosophy of Spirit is divided in three sections: I. Philosophy of Subjective Spirit; II. Philosophy of Objective; and III. Philosophy of Absolute Spirit. Each section is itself divided in three subsections: I. A. Anthropology; B. Phenomenology; C. Psychology; II. A. Right; B. Morality; C. Ethical Life (*Sittlichkeit*); III. A. Art; B. Religion; C. Philosophy.

²¹ The first way to read Hegel’s system, the most obvious and most *immediate* is to follow the order of presentation of the book (Logic-Nature-Spirit). Following Geraets however, the closing paragraphs of the *Encyclopedia* are supposedly meant to open the system to alternative, less immediate, more intimate reading, as the object (in the case, the System itself) ceases to be seen as a more or less foreign object outside of us, and more a part of our own experience. For Fischbach, this second possible reading of Hegel’s system would precisely be what takes place in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, see FISCHBACH. *Du Commencement en philosophie*. p. 209. For Geraets’s famous article on the subject, see GERAETS, T. Les trois lectures philosophiques de l’« Encyclopédie » ou la réalisation du concept de philosophie chez Hegel. *Hegel-Studien*, vol. 10, p. 231-254, 1975.

expose here, with their conclusion that from 1817 on, the *Phenomenology* cannot serve as a scientific introduction to the system, since it would already presuppose a philosophical reader (the ‘for us’) which would be Hegel’s true intended reader.²² On the opposite, I would argue that to the end, one can see the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a ladder not only to the 1812 *Science of Logic*, but also to the 1817 *Encyclopedia*. Indeed, the mere ‘formal’ possibility of thinking purely that breed from one’s freedom which constitute the starting point of the system in 1817 cannot become a ‘real’ possibility unless the conditions of such a decision becomes available to a given individual.²³ And as we shall see, the phenomenological progress toward absolute knowing acts as such a condition allowing the philosophical subject to grasp the relevance of such a move toward pure thought which then allow the opening of Hegel’s system itself.

As it is well-known, Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* can be seen as a philosophical propaedeutic devoted to bringing natural consciousness up to the level of philosophical knowledge proper. To quote Robert Stern: “its role is to lead consciousness beyond the intellectual distortions that limit our normal world-view, to a higher standpoint that transcends these limitations”.²⁴ The *Phenomenology* thus fulfills a double objective. Negatively, it corrects, through a thorough examination of the phenomenological experience of consciousness, certain misconstructions or mistakes unconsciously perpetuated by natural consciousness. Positively, it allows consciousness to understand the necessity of a philosophical standpoint able to provide the necessary ground for its relation to the world. As Hegel writes:

In my *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, which on that account was at its publication described as the first part of the *System of Philosophy*, the method adopted was to begin with the first and simplest phase of mind, immediate consciousness, and to show how that stage gradually of necessity worked onward to the philosophical point of view.²⁵

This aspect is well-captured by Stephen Houlgate when he writes:

Hegel insists [...] that philosophy, or ‘science’, may not expect the ordinary individual simply to give in to it. On the contrary, if ‘science’ expects the individual to rise up to its level, then ‘the individual has the right to demand

²² See FISCHBACH. *Du Commencement en philosophie*. p. 188.

²³ On the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘real’ possibility, cf. Giovanni, *Science of Logic*, p. 478-85.

²⁴ STERN. Introduction. p.5.

²⁵ HEGEL. *Logic*. p. 45-46, § 25.

that science, should at least provide him with the ladder to this standpoint, should show him this standpoint within himself' (§26/20). Hegel's *Phenomenology* will be that ladder. The role of the *Phenomenology*, therefore, is not to set out Hegel's own philosophy, but to lead natural consciousness from its own certainties to the perspective of philosophy, and so to *justify* such philosophy in the eyes of consciousness.²⁶

As we saw, this idea that the Jena *Phenomenology* needed to be understood as a 'preparation' allowing the reader to bring herself to the level of philosophy was already made plain by Hegel himself in 1807. The *Phenomenology* constitutes an 'introduction' (*Einleitung*) to the system of science, a "formative education"²⁷ (*Bildung*) "leading the individual from his uneducated standpoint to knowledge".²⁸ And Hegel distinguishes this introductory function attributed to the *Phenomenology* from other possible ways of initiating science. For Hegel, the *Phenomenology* is neither an *Anleitung* to science nor a *Begründung* of science.²⁹ In the Miller's translation, *Anleitung* is translated by the word 'initiation' which can be somewhat misleading. *Anleitung* typically means 'instruction' or 'guideline'.³⁰ By saying that the *Phenomenology* is not an *Anleitung* providing instructions for the 'unscientific consciousness', Hegel is stating that the *Phenomenology* is not merely a guide on how science should be conducted or Hegel's very own *Discourse on the Method*, but the process through which natural consciousness is itself transformed and brought up to the level of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, the *Phenomenology* is neither the *Begründung* or the 'foundation' of science, a role Hegel will rather confer to the *Logic* as a whole which establishes the fundamental categories of pure thought which allows the possibility of science. The *Phenomenology* is rather seen as what leads us to a position where we can properly (scientifically) address the issue of the foundation of science.³¹ In both cases, by distinguishing the *Phenomenology* as an *Einleitung* to science from and *Anleitung* and a *Begründung*, Hegel underlines the *propaedeutical* dimension of the book.

²⁶ HOULGATE. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. p. 6.

²⁷ HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 16, § 28.

²⁸ HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 16, § 28.

²⁹ See HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 15-16, § 27.

³⁰ Fischbach makes a similar point regarding Hyppolite's French translation of the *Phenomenology*, see FISCHBACH. *Du Commencement en philosophie*. p. 163.

³¹ See FULDA, H. F. *Das Problem der Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik*. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1965, p. 268.

This propaedeutical character was made, in Hegel's opinion, all the more necessary in the context of what he saw as "the degrading of present-day philosophy, through the pretentiousness and harmfulness of philosophical formulae".³² Not only can we not expect natural consciousness to be naturally inclined toward the level of reflection necessary for proper philosophy, worst, what passes for philosophy can bring them even further away from what should be philosophy. As such, the task of the *Phenomenology* is not only to immanently deconstruct the certainties, the bias and illusions of natural consciousness, but to criticize concurrent philosophical approaches which steer philosophy in the wrong direction. In both cases, the Jena *Phenomenology* fulfills its task when it allows the reader to understand not only that no one is immediately and naturally inclined to the level of thinking which is required by philosophy, but also that properly handled, philosophy should be pursued in a Hegelian fashion. This is why Hegel's *Phenomenology* is not a propaedeutic to philosophy in general, but to Hegel's system of philosophy (which he, of course, claims in a sense to be the completion of philosophy in general).³³

Quite naturally, this propaedeutical function of Hegel's 1807 *Phenomenology* can never be 'integrated' into the *Encyclopedia's* Phenomenology which already presupposes that natural consciousness has been brought up to the level of philosophy and thus, presupposes the true starting point of philosophy *per se* as science, which would be the *Science of Logic*, where all conceptual categories used to apprehend and speak of any given phenomenon (consciousness included), must first be dialectically deduced from the most universal and abstract logical categories possible, namely pure being and nothingness.

This brings us to an interesting aside. In his dissertation *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*, Marcuse noted that:

In 1807 the *Phenomenology* appeared as the first part of a system, the second part of which was supposed to be the *Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit*. In 1817 (and in the final version of the larger *Encyclopaedia*) the *Phenomenology* is no longer the first part; it is replaced by the *Logic*. Instead, the *Phenomenology* is abbreviated and essentially transformed

³² Hegel's advertisement for the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* quoted by PETRY. Introduction. p. xvii.

³³ See HEGEL, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Teil 1*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994, p. 44-45, 326. For a critical apprehension of this stance, see FEUERBACH, L. Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie. In: *Gesammelte Werke*, IX. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1970, p. 16-62.

into one section of the third part of the system, namely, of the *Philosophy of spirit*.³⁴

In this passage, Marcuse (as Heidegger³⁵) seems to adopt the perspective I intend to criticize according to which Hegel merely integrated his *Phenomenology* in the encyclopedic system as a mere transitory step or rung. If this were the case, then the shift between the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* as the initial starting point of Hegel's system could only be understood as a somewhat arbitrary change of heart. Hegel would initially have considered that a systematic approach to philosophy could begin with a scientific account of consciousness, but would later consider this possibility itself as problematic. And of course, I am not contesting that this is partly true, in the sense that, Hegel did indeed initially present the *Phenomenology* as "the first part of the *System of Science*"³⁶, but wrote by the time of the first edition of the *Encyclopedia* (1817) that he "formerly considered the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the scientific history of *consciousness*, as the first part of philosophy as far as it needed to precede pure science as the cause of its concept. But at the same time, consciousness and its history, as any other philosophical science, are not an absolute beginning, but merely a member (*Glied*) within the circle of philosophy".³⁷ Hegel thus seemed to fully assume the *Logic* as being the first part of his system.³⁸ And following Marcuse and Heidegger, the *Phenomenology* exists henceforth within the system only as a rung between Anthropology and Psychology. This is also how Guy Planty-Bonjour interpreted the term *Glied* ('member') in the passage just quoted of Hegel's 1817's *Vorbegriff*: The *Phenomenology* is merely a part of the encyclopedic system that properly constitute philosophy as a whole.³⁹

It is however significant that in the little work he had done before his untimely death on the reedition of the 1807 *Phenomenology*, one of the things Hegel modified in the preface is the

³⁴ MARCUSE, H. *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*, Trans. S. Benhabib. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987, p. 201. See also HEIDEGGER, M. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. P. Emad & K. Maly. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988 to which Marcuse explicitly refers.

³⁵ See HEIDEGGER. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 6-8.

³⁶ HEGEL. *The Science of Logic*. Trans. G. di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 10-11.

³⁷ HEGEL. *Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumausgabe (H. Glockner)*, VI. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1968, s.48.

³⁸ See HEGEL. *Logic*. p. 23-24, § 18.

³⁹ See PLANTY-BONJOUR, G. *Le Projet hégélien*, Paris: Vrin, 1993, p. 39. I agree however with Fischbach that such a reading of the passage can give way to a certain misinterpretation of the relation between the 1807 *Phenomenology* and the *Encyclopedia Phenomenology*, see FISCHBACH. *Du Commencement en philosophie*. p.181-182 n. 2.

assertion that the Jena *Phenomenology* constituted the “coming-to-be of *Science as such* or of *knowledge*”, “*as the first part of the system of science*”.⁴⁰ In fact, Hegel retained the idea that “It this coming-to-be of *Science as such* or of *knowledge*, that is described” in the 1807 *Phenomenology*, but left out the idea that it constituted as such *the first part* of the system of ‘science’. This is quite significant because it implies that while the *Logic* constitutes, in 1831, the true starting point of Hegel’s system of speculative philosophy, the *Phenomenology* remains a necessary preliminary, a preparation for natural consciousness in order to be able to be on the level of philosophical knowledge. Its function as a propaedeutic is preserved even though its position as the first part of a system of science is recant.

As Hegel argues at the very beginning of the *Great Logic*, although “*Logic is the pure science*, that is, pure knowledge in the full compass of its development”⁴¹, the proper beginning of a system of ‘science’, it nevertheless presupposes the *Phenomenology of Spirit* which “has the *concept* of science, that is, pure knowledge, for its result”.⁴² Hegel continues:

[L]ogic has for its presupposition the science of spirit in its appearance, a science which contains the necessity, and therefore demonstrates the truth, of the standpoint which is pure knowledge and of its mediation. In this science of spirit in its appearance the beginning is made from empirical, *sensuous* consciousness, and it is this consciousness which is *immediate* knowledge in the strict sense; there, in this science, is where its nature is discussed.⁴³

However, the phenomenological process from ‘immediate’ to ‘absolute’ knowledge and from natural and ‘sensuous’ to philosophical consciousness is ‘not’ necessarily the starting point of the ‘system of science’ which implies a ‘pure, presuppositionless’ beginning⁴⁴.

⁴⁰ See LABARRIÈRE, P.-J. **Structures et mouvement dialectique dans la Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel**. Paris : Aubier, 1985, p. 26. See also HEGEL. **The Science of Logic**. p. 11, n. b.

⁴¹ HEGEL. **The Science of Logic**. p. 47.

⁴² HEGEL. **The Science of Logic**. p. 46-47.

⁴³ HEGEL. **The Science of Logic**. p. 47.

⁴⁴ Much has been written on the starting point of the *Logic* and its ‘presuppositionless’ character. A position made all the more peculiar by the fact that the *Logic* seems to presuppose both the development of the *Phenomenology* and the history of philosophy. Indeed, both in his 1817 *Vorlesungen* on Logics and Metaphysics and his 1820 *Vorlesungen* on the History of philosophy, Hegel contends that the ‘historical successions’ of philosophical systems and the logical succession of conceptual determinations are in fact identical and that pure being as the starting point of the *Logic* should be put in relation to Parmenides’s philosophy, whereas the logical notion of becoming can be related to Heraclitus, etc., see HEGEL. **Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie**. p. 27; HEGEL. **Vorlesungen über Logik und Metaphysik**. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992, p. 73-74, 82. Our goal however is not to untangle this knot, but merely to understand the relation between the Jena *Phenomenology* and the *Logic* as the starting point of the system, in an effort to differentiate between the Jena and the *Encyclopedia*’s Phenomenology.

For Hegel, the starting point of science being ‘pure thought’ implies that we ‘abstract’ ourselves from what remained, within absolute knowledge, anchored in the realm of consciousness and subjectivity. In absolute knowing, the reconciliation between Substance and Subject, between the individual consciousness and Spirit (“[the] ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and [the] ‘We’ that is ‘I’”⁴⁵) remains dependent on the notions of self and experience. But this is precisely what we let go (only to recover it later in the process) when we get on with the *Logic*:

The immediate existence of Spirit, *consciousness*, contains the two moments of knowing and the objectivity negative to knowing [...] Now, although this negative appears at first as a disparity between the ‘I’ and its object, it is as much the disparity of substance with itself. Thus, what seems to happen outside of it, to be an activity directed against it, is really its own doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject. When it has shown this completely, Spirit has made its existence identical with its essence; it has itself for its object just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy, and of the separation of knowing and truth, is overcome [...] With this, the *Phenomenology* of Spirit is concluded. What Spirit prepares for itself in it, is the element of [true] knowing. In this element the moments of Spirit now spread themselves out in that *form of simplicity* which knows its object as its own self. They no longer fall apart into the antithesis of being and knowing, but remain in the simple oneness of knowing [...] Their movement, which organizes itself in this element into a whole, is *Logic* or *speculative philosophy*.⁴⁶

With the *Logic*, the idea as ‘pure knowledge’ – in which the purity is ensured by a process of abstraction of presupposition – “has relinquished any knowledge of itself that would oppose it to objectivity and would reduce the latter to a nothing; it has externalized this subjectivity and is at one with its externalization”.⁴⁷ In other words, whereas the *Phenomenology* sought to establish absolute knowledge on the basis of the unity of subject and object (while immediate consciousness initially considered knowledge to be something merely ‘objective’, i.e., lying within the object itself); *Logic* will begin by making abstraction of the subjective dimension of knowledge which pertains to consciousness, in order to (re-)establish the unity between subject and object, but, this time, not within the consciousness of “ [the] ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and [the] ‘We’ that is ‘I’”⁴⁸, but in the realm of the Idea, first considered as something merely objective (within ‘Objective Logic’) in order to let it unfold its own subjectivity as it ‘advances’ and determines

⁴⁵ HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 110, § 177.

⁴⁶ HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 21-22, § 36-37.

⁴⁷ HEGEL. *The Science of Logic*. p. 47.

⁴⁸ HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 110, § 177.

itself as the ‘Absolute Idea’.⁴⁹ At the end of this process, the reconciliation between subject and object does not merely present itself, as a Feuerbachian-like interpretation of Hegel would have it, as the collective effort of human consciousness to make sense of the world, as the unity of subject and object within the collective space of reasons of rational agents, but also as the unity of subject and object that constitute the dynamical process of reason and rationality itself. To put it bluntly, while the *Phenomenology* showcase the efforts of rational agents to make sense of the world by getting beyond the subject-object division, the *Logic* showcase how this reconciliation operates through the unfolding of reason itself not only within human consciousness, but within reality itself as the “*rational [that] is actual and [the] actual [that] is rational*”.⁵⁰ To do so, it seems however that the subjective dimension of agency and consciousness as found within the phenomenological process must be (at least temporarily) cast away.

If *Logic* seems to recant what was precisely the result and gain of the phenomenological process, in no way does it imply however a return to immediate consciousness or to the empty formalism Hegel criticizes in the ‘Preface’ to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.⁵¹ On the opposite, accessing pure knowledge as the starting point of philosophical science imply the ‘voluntary’ and ‘conscious’ act of bracketing the self⁵² and consciousness itself in order to let the inner development of pure thought as the *Sache selbst* unfolds itself until it reaches the stage of consciousness itself (within the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit). As such, quickly put, the *Logic* presupposes in a way the phenomenological path followed within the *Phenomenology of Spirit*⁵³ which takes us away from the mere ‘certainties’ of immediate natural consciousness to the truth that is absolute knowledge. But in order to begin as the science of pure thought, *Logic* must also ‘immediately’ relegate the subjective dimension of absolute knowledge which remains within the realm of consciousness and self-consciousness. In that regard, absolute knowledge, the result of the phenomenological process, is only tangentially the starting point of the *Logic*. *Logic* presupposes it, only to abstract from it, to negate an essential aspect of it, and so to begin with a presuppositionless starting point, pure being, which is in fact the result of the immediate negation of its presupposition.

⁴⁹ See HEGEL. *The Science of Logic*. p. 49.

⁵⁰ HEGEL. *Philosophy of Right*. Trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, p.11.

⁵¹ HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 9, § 15-16.

⁵² See HEGEL. *The Science of Logic*. p. 53sq.

⁵³ See RODEN ALLEN, R. Hegelian Beginning and Resolve: A View of the Relationship Between the Phenomenology and the Logic. *Idealistic Studies*, vol. 13, n. 3, p. 256.

If one can in a certain sense understand the Jena *Phenomenology* as an ‘epistemology’ or an *Erkenntnistheorie*⁵⁴ culminating with absolute ‘knowledge’ (although one should not see the *Phenomenology* as being ‘merely’ an ‘epistemological’ enterprise), the *Logic* would be on the other hand a proper theory of science (or a *Wissenschaftstheorie*). Science must rest on the solid ground of knowledge, but cannot depend on the contingencies implied by having immediate consciousness as its foundation. Indeed, the immediate or natural consciousness that constitutes the starting-point of the *Phenomenology* can at any given time misunderstand the inner contradiction that would bring it a step further on the path to absolute knowledge, it can even refuse to follow such a path of ‘despair’ and willingly remain stuck with its false (i.e., self-contradictory) but familiar certainties. This is why we have this dual motion of presupposition and abstraction from the presupposition to ensure the presuppositionless starting point of pure thought.⁵⁵ But in this dual motion, although the Jena *Phenomenology* may not retain its status as the first part of Hegel’s system of ‘science’, it nevertheless retains its function as a scientific ‘propaedeutic’ to philosophical science.

As such, the Jena *Phenomenology* is not merely “abbreviated and transformed into one section” of the *Encyclopedia* as Marcuse contends, but remains to the end, for Hegel, a ladder to the system. The only thing that changes is that whereas he initially saw this ladder as being part of the system itself, and indeed the ‘first’ part of the system, as if philosophy began through the elucidation and exposition of consciousness, he later saw that elucidating process more as

⁵⁴ See for instance, STERN, R. Introduction. In STERN, R. (ed.). **G.W.F. Hegel. Critical Assessments**, vol.3. London: Routledge, 1993, p. 2; WESTPHAL, K. **Hegel’s Epistemology**. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003.

⁵⁵ Of course, this dual motion opens various questions such as 1) to what extent the negation of the presupposition, or the fact that we must consider it and at the same time make abstraction of it, allows us to have a ‘presuppositionless’ starting point? Or 2) if science begins with *Logic* and the *Phenomenology* is (merely?) an ‘epistemology’, what is the scientific status of the *Phenomenology* which Hegel nonetheless calls the ‘science of consciousness’? As a science, doesn’t the *Phenomenology* presuppose the categories of the *Logic* which defines the pure bounds of any scientific language? But then, doesn’t the *Logic* presuppose in turn, the result of the *Phenomenology*, namely absolute knowledge? Numerous attempts have been made to find a convincing and appealing solution to these apparent difficulties (including during the conference). Again, my aim here is not to present my own argument on the topic, since my goal is to establish how the Jena *Phenomenology* may retain a determinate function in relation to Hegel’s final system and how it implies that we must distinguish between the *Phenomenology* as an introduction or a ladder to the system and the *Phenomenology* as a part or section of said system. Let me just state that the problems raised above are easier to resolve when we stop apprehending the establishment of science and knowledge as a linear process and understand that “the line of scientific forward movement [...] turns into a circle” and “that what constitutes the beginning, because it is something still undeveloped and empty of content, is not yet truly known at that beginning, and that only science, and science fully developed, is the completed cognition of it” (HEGEL. **The Science of Logic**, p. 49). In this sense, the development of science may presuppose phenomenological knowledge, while the phenomenological process may in turn imply the science of logic.

a propaedeutic to what is really the beginning of philosophy, namely the *Logic* and the elucidation of the basic categories of the concept. The Jena *Phenomenology* thus enjoys an ambiguous status in relation to Hegel's definitive systems. It is both a necessary step toward the system and, at the same time, it remains somewhat outside of it. But this is precisely the status of a ladder which allows us to access a certain level without being part of the level itself.

In fact, the very etymology of words 'propaedeutic' and 'encyclopedia' shows this ambivalent relation between the Jena *Phenomenology* and the Hegelian system as exposed in his *Encyclopedia*. They both relate to *paideia* (education), but whereas one is something one must learn 'prior' to education *per se* (*pro-paedeutic*), the other is the general or global (*enkyklios*) content of education itself, the encyclopedia.⁵⁶

In the case of philosophy however, and even more so when one thinks of Hegelian philosophy, the idea of a necessary propaedeutic may appear as somewhat awkward. Indeed, if the system of philosophy consists in the immanent self-explicitation of the Idea, it seems that its process is autonomous, presuppositionless and entirely consistent in itself (this is in fact Harris's point as stated earlier), and as such its propaedeutic would either be non-philosophical (and as such inappropriate for Hegel), or it would, in turn, presuppose what it introduces namely the conceptual categories that can only be established within the system of philosophy itself. This is why Derrida for example famously said that in regard to the relation between the 1807 *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*, one cannot assert that the former is in fact a preface to the latter: "Shall it be said – this is the traditional problem – that the entire *Phenomenology of Spirit* is in fact a preface introducing the *Logic*? [...] It is *in truth* an endless postface".⁵⁷ It cannot be a preface for Derrida because "Each of the two develops and presupposes the other".⁵⁸

This is, in a sense obvious, the *Logic* needs and presupposes, as we saw, the *Phenomenology*, which allows natural consciousness to make sense of what is going on in the *Logic*. But of course, conversely, the *Phenomenology* mobilizes notions and concepts that are in turn only fully grounded in the *Logic* and presupposes as such the *Logic*.⁵⁹ As Robert van Roden Allen writes: "Natural consciousness employs the grammar of the *Logic* even when thinking

⁵⁶ Hegel also draws attention to the circular aspect of *enkyklios* which exemplifies the idea of systematicity that he associates with his own philosophical *Encyclopedia*, see HEGEL. *Logic*. p. 20-22, § 15-16.

⁵⁷ DERRIDA, J. *Dissemination*. Trans. B. Johnson. London: Athlone Press, 1981, p. 13-14.

⁵⁸ DERRIDA. *Dissemination*. p. 13 n. 16.

⁵⁹ See HEIDEGGER. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. p. 2.

superficially and unthematically”.⁶⁰ This is why the *Phenomenology* would not be a ‘preface’ which “can rightfully have been written only after the fact”⁶¹, but a ‘postface’ written “from the viewpoint of absolute knowledge”.⁶² This point of view is nothing new, Feuerbach more or less accused Hegel of the same thing: proceeding from the conclusion while claiming an immanent self-explicitation of the Idea.⁶³

Nonetheless, despite Derrida, and despite Hegel’s own critique of philosophical prefaces (a critique which ironically opens his own preface in the 1807 *Phenomenology*⁶⁴), one may consider that, in the end, the Jena *Phenomenology* stands in relation to his system in a situation ‘analogous’ to the way its own preface stands in relation to the *Phenomenology*. The fact that the Jena *Phenomenology* necessarily uses concepts and categories that can only be thoroughly justified in the *Logic* or in the system as a whole is not sufficient to reject its propaedeutical character. It only shows that natural consciousness cannot really ‘know itself’ as Socrates would say, without raising itself to the level of philosophical thinking, because it unknowingly uses conceptual categories that can, in the end, only be grounded through a philosophical explanation. In other words, the *Phenomenology* is meant to reveal just enough of what consciousness is really about to make natural consciousness acknowledge its need for a true philosophical standpoint, which then begins with pure *Logic*.

It is in fact important to preserve the ambiguity of the preface which, as Derrida says, “belongs both to the inside and to the outside of the concept”⁶⁵ and, at the same time, “remains anterior and exterior to the development of the content it announces”⁶⁶, because it allows us not only to understand how the 1807 *Phenomenology* remained to the end, relevant, in Hegel’s view, as a way to introduce natural consciousness to the necessity of philosophy and to a

⁶⁰ RODEN ALLEN, R. Hegelian Beginning and Resolve. p. 260-61.

⁶¹ DERRIDA. *Dissemination*. p. 14.

⁶² DERRIDA. *Dissemination*. p. 14-15

⁶³ See FEUERBACH. *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie*.

⁶⁴ HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p.1, § 1: “It is customary to preface a work with an explanation of the author’s aim, why he wrote the book, and the relationship in which he believes it to stand to other earlier or contemporary treatises on the same subject. In the case of a philosophical work, however, such an explanation seems not only superfluous but, in view of the nature of the subject-matter, even inappropriate and misleading. For whatever might appropriately be said about philosophy in a preface [...] none of [it] can be accepted as the way in which to expound philosophical truth.”

⁶⁵ DERRIDA. *Dissemination*, p. 11.

⁶⁶ DERRIDA. *Dissemination*, p. 9.

systematic/scientific approach of philosophy as established through the *Encyclopedia*. It also allows us to distinguish between two phenomenologies in Hegel's final system.

Indeed, considering their function in relation to the system, the position they occupy in relation to said system, and the difference in content, one could argue that there are in fact two distinct phenomenologies in Hegel's final system.⁶⁷

Up to now, I have mainly focused on the Jena *Phenomenology* and have tried to show that it retained relevance for Hegel in relation to his system of philosophy. It is not 'integrated' to the system as a subsection of the philosophy of spirit, but maintains its role as a propaedeutic. Its function is thus distinct from the *Encyclopedia's* Phenomenology's. It would indeed be absurd to place the gateway to the system at the very end of it, in the third and last part of the *Encyclopedia*.

In fact, the functions and situations of both phenomenologies in relation to the system are intimately correlated and confirm the difference between the 1807 and the *Encyclopedia's* Phenomenology. As a 'propaedeutic' (function), the Jena *Phenomenology* can only be in an ambiguous position (situation) toward the system. It is both external and necessarily attached to it as a pathway to the system of pure thought for a natural consciousness unaccustomed to non-representative thinking. On the contrary, as a 'step' in the 'development' of the subjective spirit (function) from the immediate unity of spirit with nature through the relation between body and soul (anthropology) toward the realisation of it as a self-knowing spirit, the *Encyclopedia's* Phenomenology is situated entirely 'within' Hegel's system (situation). After having described the basic forms of cognition and activities characteristic of animal life within the *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel then establishes the specifically human forms of cognition and mental activities in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in order to explain the very possibility of social relations, ethical interactions and political institutions (which namely belong to what Hegel calls the 'Objective' spirit). To understand how human individuals can enter into contractual agreements for instance (something an animal would be unable to do), one must first establish how the human

⁶⁷ Incidentally, it implies that one cannot consider the relation between the Jena and the *Encyclopedia's* Phenomenology in the same way as one can consider the relation between Hegel's two *Science of Logic* sometime referred to as the 'Greater' and the 'Lesser' *Logic* (the latter being the *Encyclopedia's* *Logic*). Whereas both *Logics* occupy the same place within the general economy of the system and play essentially the same function as the science of pure knowledge, the same is not true for the *Phenomenology*. Accordingly, one cannot be considered merely as the summarized, shorter version of the other as it may be the case for the *Logics*, notwithstanding certain changes and developments within Hegel's treatment of *Logic* throughout the years.

mind can conceive itself as a self in relation to a world that can be both theoretically and practically apprehended. The condition of such a possibility is the clarification of the human modes of mental activities and this is precisely the object of Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. The *Encyclopedia* Phenomenology is accordingly, as the second section of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit merely a step in the analysis of the human modes of cognition specifically dedicated to the question of consciousness (of external objects and of an external world) and of self-consciousness. As such, the difference of function and place in the general economy of the system is pretty straightforward: While the *Encyclopedia* Phenomenology unpack a certain aspect of human cognition in order provide in the end (along with the Anthropology and Psychology sections) a proper image what the human mind is⁶⁸, the *Phenomenology* of 1807 presents the process through which human consciousness progressively becomes aware of the necessity to sublimate its various one-sided claims to certainty in order to proceed to knowledge itself. In the first case, the Phenomenology is part of a more general argument within the system, while the *Phenomenology* in the second case serves as an accessway to the system itself.

In regard to the difference of content between the two however, the situation is more delicate. Indeed, in the many attempts to ground his own system of philosophy in the Jena period, Hegel seems to have considered, for a time at least, beginning with a proper philosophical theory of consciousness. Of course, by the time of the *Encyclopedia*, such a solution is turned down as inadequate. In fact, Hegel saw it as the source of a certain limitation in Kant's critical philosophy.⁶⁹ But for a time at least, Hegel cherished the idea of beginning his system of science through a theory of consciousness, and the Jena *Phenomenology* could be seen as an effort in this sense. As such, it may be seen not only as a propaedeutic, but could also be understood as a preliminary attempt at a systematic theory of consciousness. Elements of this theory will of course be "integrated" to the *Encyclopedia*'s Phenomenology. Thus, there are blatant similarities in the content of both phenomenologies, especially in the 'consciousness' and 'self-

⁶⁸ To determine whether this image of the human mind is essentially an 'additive' or a 'transformative' one is naturally beyond the scope of this paper. On the subject, see CORTI, L. Hegel's Later Theory of Cognition: An Additive or Transformative Model?. *Hegel Bulletin*, 1-27, 2021. Corti argues that Hegel in fact adopts a 'transformative' stance in his later theory of cognition. The issue is naturally controversial, but if he is right, it could imply a major change of perspective for Hegel between the *Encyclopedia* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* which seems to presuppose an 'additive' model. This would further support my point on the importance of not mistaking one phenomenology with the other.

⁶⁹ See HEGEL. **Philosophy of Mind**. Being Part three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). Trans. W. Wallace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 156, § 415.

consciousness' sections. I would nevertheless argue that there are significant differences which a careful analysis of both texts could highlight. I would also argue that despite the similarities of content and treatment, the general context and finality assigned to both phenomenologies will irremediably modify the way the same content will be treated.

To make this argument plain, I shall first present briefly what I take to be the function of the Phenomenology in the general argument of Hegel's *Encyclopedia*. The Philosophy of Subjective Spirit begins, in the Anthropology, with the immediate unity of nature and spirit as it presents itself in the human organism through the dialectic between body and soul. Throughout the Anthropology, spirit 'as soul' will assert itself by overcoming its immediate and natural idleness: "the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter; for the soul, in its concentrated self, cuts itself off from its immediate being, placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence".⁷⁰ Having conquered nature within, so to speak, spirit becomes for the first time a proper 'ego', an '*Ich*' or an 'I' which now defines itself in relation and in opposition toward "a world external to it".⁷¹ Consciousness first emerges through the relation of the self toward an object external to it, and to the world in general as the realm of such objects.⁷²

As such, whereas the Jena *Phenomenology* starts with natural consciousness which has the immediate certainty of itself as an 'I' and the immediate certainty of the world, this is, in the *Encyclopedia*, on the contrary, the result of a long struggle which in a sense presupposes all previous developments. When Hegel writes at the very beginning of the *Encyclopedia*'s Phenomenology that "Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as *appearance (Erscheinung)*"⁷³, one has immediately in mind Hegel's *Logic of Essence*, in which the notion of *Erscheinung* is discussed and which more generally revolves around the idea of relation between the inner and the outer, which is here again, in the Phenomenology, central to the argument. When one addresses the issue of consciousness, self-consciousness and reason in the *Encyclopedia*, it is with all these previous developments in the background. Accordingly, the fact that consciousness of the world and of its various objects is first apprehended in a somewhat passive or 'theoretical' manner, at first through 'intuition',

⁷⁰ HEGEL. *Philosophy of Mind*. p. 151, § 412.

⁷¹ HEGEL. *Philosophy of Mind*. p. 151, § 412.

⁷² See HEGEL. *Philosophy of Mind*. p. 153, 156, 159, § 413; 415, 418.

⁷³ HEGEL. *Philosophy of Mind*. p. 153 § 413.

then ‘perception’ and then ‘understanding’, and then in a more ‘practical’ fashion, as consciousness realizes that the objects thus apprehended are merely ‘representations’ and more precisely ‘its own’ representations (which is how Hegel explains the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness) which then opens the issue of the ‘practical’ relation self-consciousness entertains with the world, first as an object of ‘desire’ that is to be consumed, then as an object of ‘work’ which is in part preserved through its transformation and so on; all these steps in the development of Subjective Spirit are meant to show the necessary transition from the sovereignty of spirit (as *Seele*) over one’s own natural body to the self-knowledge of spirit as a willful subject (in the Psychology section). The concept of ‘will’ is indeed the necessary presupposition of a moral and legal subject which opens the way to objective spirit and the sphere of *Rechtsphilosophie*. To put it simply: “In the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, Hegel presents a developmental argument that consists of progressive exploration of forms of cognition and self-relation that move from the basic (activities that first emerged in the *Philosophy of Nature*) to the more complex, until finally reaching *concrete* spiritual activities”.⁷⁴ The Phenomenology is merely a step in this process that allows for a greater determination and a deeper understanding of the cognitive processes of human cognition (or ‘subjective spirit’), opening the way for what comes next. It is an cumulative process that we find throughout Hegel systems, where any given ‘moments’ allow the emergence of a new and more concrete determination that is in turn superseded by another, and so on.

With the Jena *Phenomenology*, it is in a sense the opposite, all further determinations of what consciousness, self-consciousness, reason and spirit are, are seen as means of subtractions. They divert natural consciousness from its own illusions and bias. As natural consciousness comes to understand the real underlying mediations grounding its certainties, it knows itself better by understanding all that which it had up until now ignored. As such, it is a process of deconstruction, which is also, incidentally, a process of re-construction. One that allows consciousness to leave “the pathway of *doubt*” and “the way of despair”⁷⁵, and engage into the path of philosophical knowledge. But the goal is not here, as it is in the *Encyclopedia*, of securing one stone in the general construction of philosophical knowledge to allow for the next stone to be adequately secured in position. It would rather be to ‘unlearn’ what one thinks one knows in

⁷⁴ CORTI. Hegel's Later Theory of Cognition: An Additive or Transformative Model?. *Hegel Bulletin*, p.15.

⁷⁵ HEGEL. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p.49, §78

order to start the ‘foundations’ of philosophy (*Logic*) without erring. In both cases, the goal of the *Phenomenology* is “to raise its *self-certainty to truth*”⁷⁶, but in one case, this is achieved through the deconstruction of one’s certainty by its confrontation to the dialectics, while, in the other case, this dialectic is entirely assumed by the subject, and the progress from certainty to truth is simply achieved through the application of the dialectical method to the object of consciousness from its most abstract to its more concrete figure.

Accordingly, even if the content of both phenomenologies, especially in the case of ‘consciousness’ and ‘self-consciousness’ sections, may be very close (albeit the writing style may be very different), I argue that they nevertheless serve different purposes which has a certain effect of the content itself. Moreover, it is obvious that this similarity of content soon falls apart if we consider the ‘reason’ or ‘spirit’ sections of the 1807 *Phenomenology*. In the *Encyclopedia*, the section on Reason which was a hundred of pages long in 1807 is reduced to two short paragraphs (§438-39) and the notion of ‘spirit’ does not even belong to the *Phenomenology* section anymore but to the section on psychology. Furthermore, the Jena *Phenomenology* discusses a far greater array of questions which touches on morals which pertains, in the final system, to Objective Spirit, or arts and religion which pertain to Absolute Spirit. This is sometimes seen as a shortcoming of the Jena *Phenomenology* which seems to address too many questions at the same time⁷⁷, but I would argue that by understanding its proper function in the system, and its ambiguous relation to it as a pathway or a ladder, one can understand how such subjects are not only relevant, but necessary to the accomplishment of the Jena *Phenomenology* even though they need to be further addressed within different sections of the system to which they respectively belong. In order to grasp the necessity for a ‘philosophical’ understanding of absolute truth, one needs to understand why concurrent attempts to apprehend the absolute (through arts and religion for instance), necessarily bring us to the conclusion that we must nevertheless take a properly philosophical standpoint into account. In other words, in order to grasp the necessity of a philosophical standpoint, natural consciousness must go through the stages of moral and politics, of history and religion in order to understand both their necessity and limits on the path to absolute knowledge. Conversely, when we understand the

⁷⁶ HEGEL. *Philosophy of Mind*. p. 157, § 416.

⁷⁷ See PETRY. Introduction. p. xvii; HAERING, T. *Die Entstehungsgeschichte der Phänomenologie des Geistes*. In: Wigersma B. (Hrsg.). *Verhandlungen des 3. Hegelkongresses*, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1934, p. 119.

Encyclopedia's Phenomenology as the transitory step within the genesis of the human mind between the consciousness of oneself as a proper 'self' distinct from the merely natural animal mind (Anthropology) and the actualization of this self as a willful subject capable of fostering legal relations, contracting moral obligations and participating in a socio-political environment (Objective Spirit), it is clear why the topics discussed within the Phenomenology section will be far more limited than in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

As stated earlier, such conclusions remain preliminary. In this paper, I attempted to underline the relevance of investigating the respective roles of both the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Encyclopedia's* Phenomenology in relation to Hegel's final system. Some have questioned whether Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* even remains a significant part of his later system or whether it not merely integrated within the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit as a subsection that in no case showcase the same importance as the work of 1807. My first aim was thus to show that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* indeed maintained a significant place within Hegel's final system. Secondly, I aimed to show how its role needed to be distinguished from that of the *Encyclopedia's* Phenomenology. Consequently, I argued that we should think of Hegel's system as encompassing two 'phenomenological moments' that should be carefully compared in order provide a proper picture of the architecture of Hegel's system.

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